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Executive summary 
This summary sets out key findings from a multi-method research study to 
evaluate the implementation and impact of new powers introduced in Section 
1 of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications 
(Scotland) Act 2012.  The research aimed to provide evidence as to the Act‟s 
impact on disorder and offensive behaviour at football matches. 
Research Objectives 
The objectives for the research as outlined in the Scottish Government 
research specification document were as follows: 
 To assess the implementation of the legislation and to identify any 
barriers that may be impeding its effectiveness; 
 To evaluate whether the atmosphere and behaviour at and around 
football matches has improved since the introduction of the Act; 
 Relatedly, to assess whether the Act has also resulted in a reduction in 
offending at and around football matches; and finally, 
 To examine supporters‟ perception of the legislation, in terms of their 
understanding of its content and acceptance of its objectives. 
Research Methods  
The key elements of the mixed methods study were:  
 Two online surveys of supporters of Scottish football clubs were 
conducted as part of the study. The first survey was „live‟ between 20 
August and 20 September 2013, the second between 22 July and 5 
August 2014. 
 The surveys of Supporters Direct Scotland members and other football 
supporters may be considered a reasonable basis for hypothesising 
about the views of Scottish football supporters in general. In terms of 
sample characteristics, the vast majority were male, white and born in 
Scotland.  There was greater diversity in terms of age.  Responses were 
received from all 42 SPFL clubs, with the four largest Glasgow and 
Edinburgh clubs the best represented in the 2014 survey.  There was a 
fairly even split between season ticket holders and non-season ticket 
holders. 
 Interviews and focus groups with those involved in the implementation 
and enforcement of the legislation, including Sheriffs, Procurators Fiscal, 
Police Officers, and Club Security Officials. 
 Meetings and focus groups with football fans and with representatives of 
supporters groups.   
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 Analysis of secondary data sources, including data held by the Crown 
Office, the Scottish Government and Police Scotland. 
 Some limited observational research and informal interviewing in and 
around stadia on match days was also undertaken. 
 
Key findings and recommendations  
Resources and initiatives in support of the legislation 
The implementation, impact and perceptions of s. 1 were intertwined with 
complementary initiatives relating to policing (the establishment of the Football 
Coordination Unit Scotland (FoCUS)) and prosecution (the establishment of 
Football Liaison Prosecutors).  These resources were established prior to the 
enactment of s.1 and almost certainly helped facilitate the Act‟s quick 
adoption. 
Because of these closely inter-related initiatives, judgements about the impact 
of s.1 are impossible to disentangle from judgements about how s.1 was 
implemented.  
In terms of pre-Act resources, amongst police stakeholders FoCUS was well-
regarded for helping local police divisions work through the operational and 
tactical implications of the legislation and for providing training and other forms 
of support.  FoCUS was seen to have helped local divisions mainstream the 
operational tactics employed by FoCUS officers.  As such FoCUS was no 
longer seen primarily as a unit that was regularly required to provide direct 
operational support.  Rather, its value was perceived to be in providing central 
coordination, in particular around football-related intelligence and ongoing 
training, as well as being a centre for the development of relevant police 
policies.  
The police highly appreciated the work of Football Liaison Prosecutors who 
were located in the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS). 
They were seen as being a readily approachable point of contact within their 
regions, and they were viewed as actively helping prepare and progress s. 1 
cases.   
The implementation and enforcement of the legislation 
Fans and stakeholders alike remarked on the very visible and high-profile 
introduction and implementation of the Act.   
A primary value of the Act for police stakeholders was that it gave them added 
purpose, and added clarity, when dealing with sectarian behaviour associated 
with football.  In particular the greater clarity around offensiveness related to 
demonstrating support for terrorist organisations was seen as valuable. 
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In the enforcement of s. 1 the dominant focus was on offences occurring 
within stadia, though towards the end of this evaluation a number of high-
profile cases outside stadia had received media attention.  Given the recent  
evidence that football was the most commonly mentioned factor that people 
believe contributes to sectarianism in Scotland (Hinchliffe et. al., 2015), 
limiting the direct exposure of bystanders to any sectarian behaviour by 
individuals on route to (or from) a football fixture may be particularly 
appropriate.  
Policing and stewarding was still considered to be very inconsistent at 
different grounds, with inexperienced police officers and stewards either failing 
to act on offensive behaviours, or enforcing the legislation in a manner that 
was viewed as adversarial by fans. 
Fans and police officers alike placed value on experience, and on known 
police officers and stewards who could build up a rapport with fans.  Such 
individuals were considered more likely to be able to „head off‟ offensive 
behaviour through proactive interventions and influence.  
Tensions around the introduction of the Act however - and in particular the 
extent to which certain sections of fans felt over-policed, and subject to 
disproportionate levels of surveillance, searches and public-order style 
policing - was considered to have placed a strain on police, club and fan 
relationships at certain clubs. This was commonly remarked upon by both fans 
and police officers.  For some experienced police officers a consequence of 
this strain was that it made it harder to exert a positive influence on fans, and 
in particular to get information from fan groups about more serious criminal 
behaviour, notably violence associated with risk groups. 
After a long period where football-related violence was perceived to be in 
decline, a number of football intelligence officers and senior police officers 
confirmed that there had been a notable upsurge in football-related violence 
by certain „risk groups‟. This activity was usually located well away from actual 
football stadia.      
A concern of some police officers was that the focus of police resources on in-
stadia disorder and offensive behaviour was at the expense of resources 
being available to appropriately monitor more violent risk groups.  It was 
indeed notable within this research how groups of fans in stadia who were 
associated with enthusiastic singing and displays (and potentially offensive 
behaviour), were now commonly referred to as „risk groups‟. This conflation of 
groups of fans associated with potentially offensive behaviour with those 
engaged in much more serious, violent offences, is problematic if it implies 
specialist police resources (such as surveillance and intelligence assets) 
being diluted or diverted, or if it exposes fans who hitherto were not regarded 
as a „problem‟ to less restrained policing strategies. 
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Intelligence resources were also, at a local level, still highly variable in terms 
of quality.  Football intelligence officer roles, together with those other 
supporting roles that were key to this function (such as police match-day 
„spotters‟) were still, as previously identified in Hamilton-Smith et al, (2011), 
subject to patchy investment.  
Charges and prosecutions under section 1 of the Act 
Fan perceptions that the Act primarily focused on sectarianism were borne out 
in official statistics and stakeholder interviews, with a majority of s. 1 charges 
in both of the first two years of the Act being made against supporters of 
Rangers or Celtic, and with over 50% of s. 1 sub-charges between 2012 and 
2014 involving offensiveness associated with religion, support for terrorism or 
celebrating loss of life.   
Both fan and some stakeholder respondents in our qualitative research spoke 
of disquiet at the extent to which the Act was perceived to be targeted at 
younger fans. Some felt that younger fans were not as responsible when it 
came to the „transmission‟ of offensive songs that had been sung, and taught 
to them, by older family members and friends.  Criminalising younger fans in 
these instances was seen as disproportionate. 
Whilst younger fans (in particular those under 20) constitute a higher 
proportion of people charged under s. 1 over time (constituting 46% of 
charges in 2013/14 – 95 charges, compared to 36% in 2012/13 – 96 charges), 
this is only a proportionate increase not a numerical one, and would appear to 
reflect a steep fall in the number of older fans being charged. Charges against 
older fans (aged 31 and above) fell from 71 in 2012-13 (26% of all charges) to 
24 charges in 2013-14 (12% of all charges).This may be due to older fans 
complying with the legislation more quickly, though some fan-respondents 
argued that it was because younger fans were an „easy target‟ for 
enforcement.  
The „success‟ of the Act in terms of successful prosecutions under s. 1, has 
notably faltered in the last year, with the published rate for s. 1 prosecutions 
across Scotland dropping from 73% to 52%. Our analysis would suggest that 
this drop in convictions may not only be an issue for s. 1 offences, but also for 
other football-related charges such as breach of the peace.   
The time taken, on average, to progress and conclude football-related 
charges, appears to be particularly lengthy. Again, this does not pertain 
exclusively to s. 1 charges. In our qualitative research the length of time taken 
to progress cases was perceived as a source of frustration and unfairness by 
some fans. 
Sheriffs‟ views were divided on the Act, ranging from strongly in support to 
emphatically critical. Most often, though, they expressed a mixture of support 
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for s.1 and criticism.  Supportive comments focused on the aims of the Act, 
tackling what some viewed as a serious problem. Some sheriffs however were 
concerned about s.1‟s clarity and human rights implications. Some also felt 
that the quality of evidence in cases brought under section 1 was sometimes 
weaker than it could be, with one emphasising that he would appreciate expert 
witness evidence on the meaning of behaviours labelled as offensive.  
Supporters’ awareness and general perceptions of the legislation 
Awareness of the Act was high in our fan surveys - at around four in five of all 
supporters (83% had heard of it in the 2014 survey) and higher still among 
supporters of Celtic and Rangers.  Awareness was also several percentage 
points higher in 2014 than in 2013. 
A slight majority of supporters surveyed in 2014 (55%) reported sometimes 
being offended by things they heard other supporters shouting, chanting or 
singing, but 50% also agreed that “people go to football matches to let off 
steam and that what they say should not be taken seriously”. 
Where offence was likely to be taken, surveyed supporter dislikes were 
broadly in line with the objectives of the Act. There was broad consensus that 
it is offensive to sing songs or to make remarks about people's religious 
background or beliefs (85% agreeing with this statement), or which celebrate 
the loss of life (90% agreeing), or which support terrorist organisations (82% 
agreeing).   
The formal aims of the Act were to focus on a range of offensive behaviours, 
typically conceived as hate crime, such as offensiveness targeted on the basis 
of religion, sexuality, race, or professing support for terrorism.  However, the 
Act was developed and introduced in a political and media environment where 
the legislation was primarily seen as a tool to address sectarian offensiveness. 
Fans and stakeholders in our qualitative research largely viewed the Act in 
this way. 
In our qualitative research, fans who did not follow Rangers or Celtic often 
described the Act in terms of being focussed on supporters of those two 
teams, and for many this seemed justifiable. However, it is to be noted that 
some of these same fans also described behaviours and „banter‟ occurring 
elsewhere that would just as appropriately merit attention under the Act (e.g. 
racist and homophobic remarks and singing).  Indeed, our supporters‟ survey 
demonstrates that fans did sometimes encounter such offensiveness. For 
instance in 2013/14, 22% of supporters attending away games heard negative 
references to a person‟s sexuality and 16% heard negative references to a 
person‟s skin colour.  
Fans in the qualitative research also provided slightly contradictory responses 
when characterising their understanding of the s.1 offence. It was often 
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claimed that what songs or behaviours fell under the remit of the legislation 
was ambiguous and uncertain. When probed however, it did appear that most 
respondents knew exactly what behaviours would potentially contravene the 
Act.  This ambiguity seemed to refer to disagreements about whether certain 
„borderline‟ songs, words or gestures should fall under the Act (and a desire 
for this to be definitively clarified) and second, uncertainty about whether 
songs or behaviour would lead to enforcement action in different locations 
and/or at different football grounds (i.e. their uncertainty referred to 
inconsistencies in enforcement). 
Where songs or other acts were disputed in terms of their offensiveness, 
grounds for dispute rested on two areas of ambiguity.   First, songs, chants or 
displays that made mention of organisations or movements that, at some 
point, could have been associated with terrorism, but which at other points in 
time could be associated with legitimate organisations and/or political 
standpoints. Second, expressing a cultural identity, which whilst it could not be 
said to explicitly communicate any hatred or opposition to another‟s culture, 
ethnicity, politics, or religion, could nevertheless be construed as offensive 
simply because that cultural identity was viewed as intrinsically „oppositional‟ 
or provocative by others.    
The role of clubs 
In the qualitative research, fans had different perspectives on the role of their 
clubs in relation to the legislation. Whilst some fans had received helpful 
communication from their clubs when the Act was introduced, others felt that 
their club was unclear or „hedged‟ their advice on the implications of s.1. 
Conversely club officials felt unable to offer advice in some instances in the 
absence of legal precedent.   
Whilst acknowledging that clubs had done good work in the past, in particular 
around sectarianism, some fans felt that clubs needed to take more 
responsibility for addressing these issues amongst their fan base.    
Impact of the Act – perspectives and experiences 
It was acknowledged by fans and stakeholders alike that the Act was 
introduced in a way that gave it a high profile and made a rapid impact.  Whilst 
this generated hostility amongst some fans, it was also acknowledged by 
some fans and stakeholders that this had an immediate impact on behaviour.  
In terms of the prevalence of specific forms of potentially offensive behaviours 
(whether those „criminal‟ or not) encountered by surveyed supporters, by far 
the most common was swearing at players and officials, followed by swearing 
at other supporters. 
Around a third (28%) of home supporters said they had heard negative 
reference to a person's religious background during at least one game in the 
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2013/14 season, higher than the proportion that had heard negative reference 
to a person‟s skin colour (8%), country of origin (19%), gender (10%) or 
sexuality (19%). 
The reported prevalence of these verbal behaviours was broadly stable 
between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 seasons. There was an increase, however, 
in potentially offensive non-verbal behaviours in 2013/14 - especially letting off 
flares, throwing of missiles and the displaying of offensive banners (see Table 
4.1 for more details). 
A better measure however of long-term changes in behaviour were questions 
that asked fans to judge the prevalence of certain behaviours in relation to 
„previous seasons.‟ With the sole exception of letting off flares, in both 
surveys, supporters were likely to view each specific type of behaviour as 
being less common than in previous seasons, as opposed to being more 
common. For example, 40% of home supporters felt negative references to 
religious background were less common in the 2013/14 season than in 
previous seasons, while only 3% felt it was more common. 56% of supporters 
felt that the level of negative references to religious background was about the 
same as in previous seasons. 
Fans and stakeholders in the qualitative research mostly held similar views, 
with fans of Rangers and Celtic in particular noting a marked decline in certain 
types of offensive behaviour at home games.   
Impact of the Act – official data 
Official data on football-related offending would seem to lend support to these 
fan and stakeholder judgements, indicating a marked decline in football-
related charges, including hate crime charges, between the first and second 
full years after the introduction of the Act, and with a 24% reduction in s. 1 
charges overall betweeen 2012-13 and 2013-14.  
Positive as these trends are, it is impossible to determine whether some, or 
any of these reductions are attributable directly to the Act (though some fans 
and police officers clearly felt that the Act had had an impact), to the policing 
or prosecutorial resources that were put in place in the year before the Act, or 
indeed to the broader societal context which has witnessed sustained declines 
in violence and disorder more generally over a number of years.    
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Recommendations 
It is not in the remit of the evaluation to engage in political and normative 
debates about the continued existence of the Act.  Our remit is to comment on 
the Act‟s „effectiveness‟ and to suggest ways in which that „effectiveness‟ 
might be enhanced.   
Recommendation 1 (R1) The formal objectives of the Act are to address a 
variety of hate crimes, not just sectarianism. Acknowledging that there 
appears to have been a recognised reduction in sectarian-associated 
offences, this broader focus needs to be strengthened. 
R2 Careful consideration needs to be given to how best to improve 
relationships and trust between supporters groups, clubs and the police. This 
is critical if recent gains in terms of reductions in criminalised activity are to be 
consolidated. 
There is already evidence that fans within stadia are self-policing each other 
to an extent. The more fans identify with the aims and legitimacy of the Act, 
and the more that they approve of (and identify with), official actors in terms of 
how they enforce the Act, the stronger one would expect this self-policing to 
be. 
R3 In terms of police and club operational tactics, a clearer demarcation 
needs to be made between violent risk groups and other sets of fans who are 
at risk of engaging in non-violent, offensive behaviour. 
R4 Clubs, in particular, need to be re-engaged with work in this area, for 
instance taking forward educational initiatives, and having a much closer 
dialogue with supporters groups.  
R5 Clubs and the police authorities should continue to focus on balancing the 
need to hold secure matches, free from offensiveness and disorder, whilst 
ensuring a consistent and proportionate response to the policing of more vocal 
and enthusiastic fan groups.     
Grievances about inconsistent treatment were particularly emphasised by 
those supporters who travelled to away games. In our 2013 survey 81% of 
away supporters agreed that they were treated very differently at different 
stadiums by stewards and police.  Fans and police officers alike valued more 
experienced officers and stewards in part, precisely because, they would act 
with more consistency.   
R6 Models of good stewarding and local policing should be identified and 
strengthened. 
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R7 Given the great range of behaviours encompassed by the Act (with the 
types of offensiveness covered ranging widely in terms of seriousness), 
greater consideration should be given to a more nuanced set of responses, 
shading from club-focussed sanctions and diversionary measures that 
preclude the need to impose a criminal record, through to appropriate criminal 
penalties for more serious or incorrigible offenders. For instance, 
consideration should be given to using diversionary sanctions for less serious 
s. 1 offences (and for first time offenders) such as short football banning 
orders (ideally combined with match period sign-on conditions to maximise 
effectiveness). 
R8 More serious s. 1 cases should receive faster consideration by relevant 
agencies, and should reach a conclusion more quickly. This, particularly if 
combined with the previous recommendation, would potentially improve 
confidence in the fairness and proportionality of charges made under s. 1 of 
the Act.  
 
11 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 This report presents findings from the Scottish Government-commissioned 
evaluation of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications 
(Scotland) Act 2012. This evaluation was conducted by a research team drawn 
from the University of Stirling, the University of Glasgow and ScotCen Social 
Research. The evaluation formally started in June 2013 and concluded in early 
2015.  
1.2 The evaluation used both quantitative and qualitative research methods to 
explore the introduction, enforcement and impact of the legislation, gauging the 
perspectives of a wide range of stakeholders (e.g. fans, supporters groups, clubs, 
football authorities, the police, procurators fiscal, the judiciary, and other interested 
parties). 
 1.3 Central to this report are the findings from both sweeps of an online survey of 
supporters of Scottish football clubs, carried out in August/September 2013 and 
July/August 2014. The first survey focused on supporters‟ experiences of attending 
football matches during the 2012-13 season, including whether they had witnessed 
certain types of behaviour that might be deemed „offensive‟. The second survey 
was almost identical and focused on supporters‟ experiences during the 2013-14 
season, in an attempt to trace changes that might have arisen from the new 
legislation following the initial „bedding in‟ period. In both sweeps, supporters were 
also asked about their awareness of new legislation relating to offensive behaviour 
at football matches which came into force in the spring of 2012. This quantitative 
research was complemented by qualitative research with supporters through 
interviews, focus groups and some limited observations of fans‟ experiences at 
football matches. 
1.4 The rest of this chapter explains the background to the legislation relating to 
offensive behaviour at football and why the evaluation was commissioned by the 
Scottish Government. The second chapter provides more detailed information 
about how the research was carried out. The remainder of the report summarises 
some of the key findings emerging from preliminary analysis of survey and from 
other data.  
Background 
1.5 The Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications 
(Scotland) Act 2012 (hereafter known as the Act) was passed by the Scottish 
Parliament on 14 December 2011, received Royal Assent on 19 January 2012 and 
came into force on 1 March 2012. The Act was introduced following concerns about 
a perceived increase in various „offensive‟ behaviours within the context of football. 
As stated in the policy memorandum: 
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“In summary, it is a critical assumption of this Bill that there is something very 
specific and increasingly unacceptable about attitudes and behaviour expressed 
at football matches, whether that be “sectarian”, racist or homophobic.”1  
1.6 Although the Act is designed to tackle a range of hate crimes and is not 
restricted to tackling sectarianism, the Scottish Government specifically believed 
the existing legislation and common law provisions to be inadequate to deal with 
the perceived increase in sectarian-related behaviours in and around football 
grounds.2 After several years of comparatively improved behaviour and 
atmospheres at domestic matches (Hamilton-Smith et al. 2011), the 2010-11 
season saw a number of controversial incidents, both on and off the pitch, and 
mostly associated with either Rangers or Celtic (or both). The two teams met on 
seven occasions during the season, and the police reported a significant impact on 
their resources as a result of this. A period of heightened political and media focus 
followed. Both Celtic and Rangers fans were warned by Strathclyde Police and the 
football authorities about football-related violence and singing sectarian songs, and 
in April 2011 Rangers were fined £35,000 by UEFA, and supporters banned from 
one away game, after their fans sang sectarian songs during a Europa League 
match against PSV Eindhoven.3 A Scottish Premier League game between 
Rangers and Celtic on 20th February 2011 reportedly saw 229 related arrests4 in 
the Strathclyde police force area. This was followed by a highly publicised Scottish 
Cup match between the same two clubs at Celtic Park on 2nd March 2011 which 
saw three Rangers players sent off, a number of on-pitch confrontations between 
players and coaching staff, 34 supporters being arrested inside the stadium 
(including 20 for alleged religiously-aggravated breaches of the peace) and a 
reported total of 187 related arrests.5  
These statistics, though certainly higher than for an average game between these 
two teams, were not especially high by historic standards for this fixture6. However, 
on this occasion the increased media and political spotlight, and a growing view 
                                         
1
 Scottish Government, Policy Memorandum on the Offensive Behaviour in Football and 
Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 1) as introduced in the Scottish Parliament on 
16 June 2011. 
2
 Policy Memorandum, as above, p.1 
3
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/13218273 
4
 These figures do need to be treated with some caution, as whether these 229 arrests in the wider 
Strathclyde police force area could genuinely be attributed to the Rangers-Celtic match is a 
contentious assertion. The same caveat applies to the figures reported for the Cup match on 2nd 
March  2011. 
5
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competitions/scottish-premier/8360710/Celtic-v-
Rangers-Strathclyde-Police-to-demand-Old-Firm-reform-after-shameful-scenes.html 
6
 By way of illustration, two typical, well attended games between these two teams at Celtic Park in 
the 2006-07 season resulted in 10 and 16 stadia arrests respectively (ACPOS match reports 
figures for games on the 23th September 2006 and the 11th March 2007). However, by way of 
contrast the league championship decider on the 2nd May  1999 resulted in 113 arrests at Celtic 
Park (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sport/football/scottish_premier/334291.stm ), whilst the famous 
1980 Scottish Cup final encounter on the 10th May at Hampden Park resulted in over 200 arrests.  
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that the social and policing costs of such fixtures were no longer acceptable, meant 
that shortly after the match a summit was requested by the police.  
1.7 The police specifically argued that there was a correlation between Rangers-
Celtic fixtures and a spike in reported instances of domestic violence, and this was 
widely covered by the Scottish media. The summit was subsequently convened by 
the First Minister. Representatives of Celtic and Rangers, the Scottish Football 
Association (SFA) and Strathclyde Police duly developed a plan to tackle behaviour 
related to Rangers-Celtic fixtures.7  
1.8 At the same time, an ongoing series of hate crime incidents targeted at 
certain high-profile figures in Scotland was also the subject of intense media focus. 
Neil Lennon, the Celtic manager at the time, received death threats and bullets in 
the post. Attempts were also intercepted to send parcel bombs to Lennon, the late 
Paul McBride QC and MSP Trish Godman (both high-profile Celtic-supporting 
Catholics), as well as to Cairde na hÉireann, an Irish Republican group based in 
Glasgow. As a result of these incidents, sectarianism in Scotland, and its perceived 
links to football, emerged as a key item on the political agenda after some years of 
relative quiet. From this increased focus on tackling offensive behaviour at and 
around football, with a specific concern about sectarianism, various measures were 
put in place by the Scottish Government. A Joint Action Group was set up following 
the summit, and met throughout 2011 “with a focus on supporting the further 
development of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening 
Communications (Scotland) Act and to consider and agree further measures to 
tackle unacceptable supporter conduct” (http://www.gov.scot/Topics/archive/law-
order/sectarianism-action-1/football-violence/football-summit/JAG). It should be noted 
that these initiatives were formally separate from, though associated with, a wider 
range of Scottish Government-supported activities to address sectarianism.  Most 
notably, an independent advisory group was established to conduct its own 
investigation into sectarianism, resulting in the production of a high-profile interim 
report which was submitted to Ministers in December 2013, which presented its 
final report in May 20158.  Under the auspices of this advisory group, Government 
funding was also provided for community-based and educational initiatives aimed at 
tackling sectarianism in Scotland and for commissioning of research into various 
aspects of sectarianism. A multi-pronged approach to sectarian and other offensive 
behaviours thus appeared to be the government‟s intention, with behaviour at and 
around football being one aspect of it. 
1.9 In June 2011, the Scottish Government published proposals for new 
legislation to curb offensive behaviour around football matches, with particular 
emphasis on „sectarian‟ behaviour: 
“The objective of the Bill is to tackle sectarianism by preventing offensive and 
threatening behaviour related to football matches and preventing the 
                                         
7
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-12670175 
8
 See http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/05/4296 
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communication of threatening material, particularly where it incites religious 
hatred.”9 (Policy Memorandum). 
1.10 The legislation was also designed to deal with threatening communications, 
thereby responding to the incidents mentioned above. The government‟s initial plan 
was for legislation to be in place before the start of the 2011-12 football season and 
it sought to achieve this by recourse to emergency legislation procedures.10 
However, concerns were raised regarding the need for a better consultative 
process, and the passage of the Bill was delayed to allow time for wider views to be 
sought and for further debate by Parliament.11 The Bill received Royal Assent on 19 
Jan 2012 and came into force on 1 March 2012, towards the end of the 2011-12 
football season.  
Overview of Act 
1.11 The Act, as discussed above, dealt with two key problems: (1) offensive 
behaviour in and around football matches and (2) threatening communications 
(threats of serious violence or incitement to hatred which have been made in a 
recorded format). The second element of the Act (threatening communications) is 
broader and need not involve either sectarianism or football.  
1.12 This research is concerned only with the former, which is dealt with in 
Section 1 of the Act. This creates an offence of engaging in behaviour „in relation to 
a regulated football match‟ which „is likely to incite public disorder‟ and which is 
hateful, threatening or is „other behaviour that a reasonable person would be likely 
to consider offensive‟. Hateful behaviour is defined as „expressing hatred‟ of, 
„stirring up hatred‟ against, or „motivated by hatred‟ of (whether wholly or partly) an 
individual or a group of persons, based on their membership (or presumed 
membership) of certain groups. These include a religious group or a social or 
cultural group with a perceived religious affiliation or a group defined by reference 
to one of the following: colour; race; nationality (including citizenship); ethnic or 
national origins; sexual orientation; transgender identity; disability. 
 1.13 „Other behaviour that a reasonable person would be likely to consider 
offensive‟ is not defined in the Act, but the Lord Advocate‟s Guidelines state that 
„Officers should have regard to proportionality, legitimate football rivalry and 
common sense when assessing whether the conduct would cause offence to the 
reasonable person.‟ They give examples of flags, banners, songs or chants „in 
support of terrorist organisations‟ or which „glorify, celebrate or mock events 
involving the loss of life or serious injury‟.12 The analysis of the operation of the first 
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 Scottish Government Policy Memorandum on the Offensive Behaviour in Football and 
Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 1) as introduced in the Scottish Parliament on 
16 June 2011. 
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 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-13796044 
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 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-13916556 
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http://www.copfs.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution_Policy_Guidance/Lord_Advocates_Gui
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ons%20Scotland%20Act%202012.PDF  (emphasis in original).  
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year of the Act found that all of the charges under this category noted behaviour 
which was said to refer to „terrorism and terrorist organisations‟.13 
1.14 The offence requires the Crown to prove either that an individual‟s conduct 
was likely to provoke public disorder; or that this would have been likely but for 
other circumstances. As noted above, the Act provides that „behaviour would be 
likely to incite public disorder‟ if public disorder would be likely to occur but for the 
fact that: 
(a) measures are in place to prevent public disorder, or 
(b) persons likely to be incited to public disorder are not present or are not 
present in sufficient numbers. 
1.15 Thus, it is not a defence to a charge of criminal conduct that rival fans had 
been segregated, or that police or stewards were present to maintain public order. 
It is this element that has led to the section being described by some as overly 
broad. Lord Brodie, speaking on behalf of the Appeal Court following the decision 
that a sheriff had erred in law when  he acquitted Joseph Cairns, who had been 
charged with singing pro-IRA songs at a match between Ross County and Celtic in 
Dingwall, said that the Parliament had created  “a criminal offence with an 
extremely long reach"‟14.  
1.16 Section 1 covers not only conduct at a regulated football match, but also 
conduct „in relation to a regulated football match‟. It therefore covers behaviour 
during a journey to or from a match (including on public transport), behaviour in 
pubs or clubs or other places that are showing televised football, and matches that 
are played abroad if they include a Scottish club. A „journey‟ includes overnight 
breaks and it applies not only to persons attending a match but also to others who 
were not intending to do so. The Lord Advocate‟s Guidelines advise that this 
includes persons who participate in such behaviour „alongside fans who are 
travelling on such a journey‟. These others need not previously have been aware of 
the match. There has yet to be an Appeal Court judgment of whether their 
behaviour also needs to be in relation to the regulated football match, or whether it 
is enough that they engaged in some way with those who are on that journey.15 
1.17 Section 1 does far more than place common law breach of the peace on a 
statutory footing or restate section 38 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2010. It 
targets and labels behaviour related to football and provides for the courts to take 
account of that in sentencing decisions. The targeting of football has been 
supported by additional police and prosecution resources introduced in March 2011 
(specifically, the appointment of Football Liaison Prosecutors, procurators fiscal 
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 Amy Goulding & Ben Cavanagh Charges reported under the Offensive Behaviour at Football 
and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act (2012) in 2012-13 Justice Analytical Services, 
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 http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2013HCJAC73.html 
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 See further HMA v Blance [2013] HCJAC 131 https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/search-
judgments/judgment?id=098586a6-8980-69d2-b500-ff0000d74aa7  
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who are football specialists but also retain a wider role as procurator fiscal deputes) 
and the creation of a Football Coordination Unit for Scotland (FoCUS))16. The aims 
of these measures were to increase the specialist resources available to police 
football-related behaviour, and to improve the quality and consistency of decision 
making from the point of arrest to the point of sentence. The other major legal 
change is the section 6 offence of communicating threats of serious violence or 
threats inciting religious hatred, but this is not the subject of this report.  
1.18 It is important to note that the Act does not use the word „sectarian‟ or 
„sectarianism‟, instead making use of more established terms in Scots law such as 
hatred based on religion, race, sexual orientation, disability and so on to capture 
the various behaviours that are dealt with in section 1. The term „sectarian‟ is 
problematic and highly contested and has not been used in any criminal legislation 
in the UK. However, both media and parliamentary discussions around the 
legislation continue to focus on „sectarian‟ behaviour.  
The Act makes provision for prison sentences of up to five years for those 
convicted on indictment of either the offensive behaviour at football or the 
threatening communication offences. 
Discussion of the Act 
1.19 As previously noted, the Act has been the subject of some controversy since 
its inception. Although it is not our intention to recap those arguments in detail – our 
remit is to evaluate the Act as it has been implemented – the key issues raised 
through these discussions should be noted. The main criticisms of the Act 
concerned its putative freedom of speech implications, the failure to define 
„offensive behaviour‟ and a lack of precision in some other elements17, and whether 
or not there was a gap in the existing law which justified its introduction. Some of 
these criticisms were addressed in Committee and during the Parliamentary 
debates,18 but not all of them were and it is unsurprising that the first eighteen 
months of the Act‟s existence have been controversial. Although there have been 
many successful prosecutions, many have failed. It was not possible to find out 
whether this has been due to weak evidence being provided to the court, or 
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 The majority of these resources were in fact introduced sometime before the enactment of the 
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 A key area of concern focused on a test of offensiveness being based on the broad formulation 
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7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  See 
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 For comments and responses, see  the Justice Committee Report at 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_JusticeCommittee/Reports/OFBTC_Bill_FINAL.pdf 
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because sheriffs have taken contrary views to fiscals on whether certain behaviours 
are caught by the Act,but some have been successful despite the sheriffs‟ criticisms 
of either the breadth of the Act or its use in the particular circumstances of the 
case.19 In Cairns the High Court commented on sheriffs‟ perceived 
misunderstanding of the legislation,20 while some fan groups and commentators 
have robustly expressed their concerns around „over-policing‟ and unfair treatment.  
1.20 Many of the debates over the merits of the legislation have focused on the 
extent to which certain behaviours at football can legitimately be deemed to be hate 
crimes, sectarian or otherwise and the degree of harm that may be attributed to 
them (for example, not only in terms of any immediate offence caused, but also 
potentially in terms of perpetuating wider social divisions and tension). Of course, 
the existence of „sectarianism‟ in Scotland is itself a contentious one; some 
scholars argue that it is a „thing of the past‟ (Bruce 2004) while others believe that it 
is a problem with far deeper roots in Scottish society (e.g. Devine (ed.) 2000; Kelly 
2003).21 Clayton (2005) argues that „sectarian‟ attitudes and behaviours are 
generally only identified at football matches, suggesting that the problem is limited 
to a form of „football sectarianism‟ as opposed to a serious social problem. This 
perception is in keeping with Bruce et al.‟s (2004) argument of „tribalism‟ or what is 
also sometimes referred to as ‟90 minute sectarianism‟. Devine meanwhile argues 
that more qualitative research is needed.22 But however it may be articulated the 
interplay between football and hate crime, particularly sectarianism, and the 
broader significance of that interplay, is crucial to any critical consideration of the 
Act. Recent survey research (Hinchliffe et al., 2105) suggests that most people do 
see a strong link between football and sectarianism. However, there may be a 
degree of circularity in the relationship between public perceptions and legislative 
activity - in other words, in responding to apparent public concern about the link 
between football and sectarianism, the Act itself may have also served to amplify 
that perception. Debates have also centred on the fact that the Act targets football 
supporters specifically, as opposed to legislating uniformly. As will be explored 
further in chapter 3 of this report, many supporters and representatives from 
supporters‟ organisations expressed concern that football fans have been unfairly 
singled out. 
Placing section 1 in its legal context 
1.21 Section 1 is not unique. Some of its language appears in other statutes,23 and 
much of what it deals with is familiar to criminal lawyers. Sport spectatorship 
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 MacDonald v Cairns [2013] HCJAC 73  
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 Tom Devine presentation at the Scottish Religious Cultures Network, 5 March 2014 
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 See for instance s 56 of the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006, 
dealing with football banning orders, and s.74 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, dealing 
with religious aggravation of an offence. See also s.96 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 , 
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(especially football) has for many years attracted specific regulation by the criminal 
law throughout the UK and many parts of Europe. Both Scotland and 
England/Wales for example have specific laws to cover drinking in and around 
stadia,24 and England/Wales has specific legislation on football ticket touting, pitch 
invasions and racist chanting at football.25  
1.22 Much of the behaviour of football supporters is governed by the „public order‟ 
family of offences (such as the common law offences of breach of the peace or 
mobbing and rioting) to which section 1 belongs. Whether something is a risk to 
public order depends on the circumstances of where it happens, so that behaviour 
which might be disruptive but lawful26 in everyday life can become unlawful in a 
mass football setting. Furthermore, one of the aims of these offences is to prevent 
disorder before it happens.27 The offences therefore catch supporters who are 
attempting to do things which could cause a disturbance, not just those who already 
have. Hence, public order offences are not precisely worded and, because of that 
uncertainty, raise legitimate human rights concerns. We will consider later in this 
report the comments that were made by sheriffs and fiscals about section 1. 
Breach of the peace 
1.23 Section 1 is closest to the common law offence of breach of the peace and 
the similar statutory „section 38 offence‟. Breach of the peace has been a 
notoriously wide and vague offence in the past, but was somewhat narrowed by 
Smith v Donnelly28, which keeps it within the limits of the European Convention on 
Human Rights,29 although some argue that it remains more vague than it should be 
(Ferguson 2013, p. 93). The Smith test requires the prosecution to show two things. 
First, that the accused‟s conduct is „genuinely alarming and disturbing‟. Second, the 
conduct must also in the surrounding circumstances30 threaten „serious disturbance 
to the community‟. If there is no evidence that people were in fact alarmed, then the 
conduct must be of the sort that would be alarming or seriously disturbing to any 
reasonable person in those particular circumstances.  
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
dealing with racial aggravation of an offence; s.50A of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) 
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 Wilson v Brown 1982 Scots Law Times 361. 
28
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 Dyer v Hutchison 2006 JC 212 http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2006/HCJAC_45.html  
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1.24 What amounts to something that would seriously disturb the „community‟ has 
been interpreted broadly. For example, shouting abuse at two paramedics in a 
private flat met the test, because a door was open onto the public street.31 An 
offence can even take place in private, but there would need to be evidence that 
there was a realistic risk of the conduct being discovered.32 That the behaviour is 
absorbed in a „cauldron of sound‟ at a football game is not a defence either, the 
Appeal Court having asserted that „in the context of a noisy crowd the provocative 
nature of what was said and done takes on even greater significance.‟33  
Threatening or abusive behaviour 
1.25 The other offence most similar to section 1 is section 38 of the Criminal 
Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, dealing with threatening or abusive 
behaviour. A person will commit a section 38 offence if they behave in a threatening 
or abusive manner which would be likely to cause a reasonable person to suffer 
fear or alarm. They must have either intended this to cause fear or alarm, or have 
been reckless as to whether it would. This can be in public or private, and again, 
the potentially alarmed person does not have to be present. In a case where a man 
engaged in „vile, general and specific threats to well-known persons both dead and 
alive‟34 inside a locked police van, the court said that it „did not require to consider 
the likelihood of the remarks actually reaching‟ the person who might be frightened 
or alarmed.35 On appeal it was added that if a reasonable person would have 
suffered fear or alarm „it is no defence if the behaviour causes no fear or alarm to 
the individual complainer, who might be, for example, an intrepid Glasgow police 
officer.‟36 
1.26 The High Court has commented that breach of the peace should not be 
limited to cases in which there was evidence of actual alarm or annoyance, 
because there is a „safeguard against any undue expansion of the law‟ that the 
conduct must be genuinely alarming and disturbing to any reasonable person.37 
Likewise, the essence of the section 38 offence „is that the accused's conduct is to 
be judged by an objective test in which the actual effect of the threatening or 
abusive behaviour on those who experience it is irrelevant‟.38 The test again is the 
effect on the reasonable person. Hence, the sweep of both offences is broad and it 
is not clear what forms of offensive behaviour, particularly singing, would or would 
not be caught by them.  
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1.27 It can be seen therefore that the margins of the pre-existing law that dealt 
with the sorts of football offences tackled by section 1 are themselves indistinct. 
They are capable of being extended to cover many situations where potential 
victims of public disorder need not necessarily be present.  
Section 1’s relationship with existing offences 
1.28 Section 1 has therefore been introduced into an area of law which is already 
so broad that it is difficult to identify what changes the section actually makes (other 
than more clearly labelling the conduct it deals with). Criminal law academic 
Professor Pamela Ferguson has said, regarding breach of the peace, that 
„[w]hether any particular behaviour would amount to breach of the peace has 
always been hard to predict‟ (2013, pp. 132-137). Most of the ways in which a 
section 1 football offence can be committed are similar to those captured by breach 
of the peace or section 38, so it is useful to consider section 1 in the light of how 
legal commentators and the appeal courts have looked at these other offences.  
1.29 The „stirring up hatred‟ element of section 1, however, is novel. It takes the 
form of an incitement to disorder offence and the behaviour itself need not be 
alarming or disturbing. Section 1 here differs from most incitement offences by not 
specifying the need to prove a specific intention to commit the crime. The Scots 
common law offence of incitement to commit a crime requires evidence of „a serious, 
earnest and pointed attempt by the accused to encourage and instruct a crime‟: it is 
important under the common law that the person seriously intended the crime to 
happen.39 Likewise, the equivalent English law makes clear that it is not enough if 
the offence that resulted was merely a foreseeable consequence.40 There have 
been no appeal cases to clarify the interpretation of „stirring up‟ hatred in section 1. 
One sheriff noted that there have been very few prosecutions on this point to date 
and we have been unable to locate any reported judgments on the matter. But it is 
an important point and one which could be the subject of an appeal in the future. 
Summary of the legal context 
1.30 The criticisms made of section 1 are therefore familiar to critics of public 
order offences. Other similar offences such as breach of the peace and section 38 
are also broadly drawn and broadly interpreted, and have raised similar concerns 
about civil liberties among legal commentators. These concerns include, for 
instance, the vagueness of concepts such as the „reasonable person‟ or „public 
disorder‟ when used in circumstances where behaviour may be categorised of 
having amounted to a risk of disorder yet did not in fact produce it. There is a long 
history in Scots and English law of civil liberties challenges to public order offences, 
some of which have been appealed, sometimes successfully, as far as the 
European Court of Human Rights. What is clearly new about section 1 is that it 
targets and labels behaviour related to football and provides for the courts to take 
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account of that in sentencing decisions. It may also have extended Scots criminal 
law, certainly at least as regards the offence of stirring up hatred.  
The wider objectives 
1.31 During the progress of the bill through Parliament the Scottish Government 
formally committed to evaluating the implementation and impact of the Act. This 
evaluation is therefore a statutory requirement in accordance with section 11 of the 
legislation and had two main formal objectives: 
1) to undertake a process evaluation to examine the implementation of the 
legislation, including the practices and mechanisms put in place to support its 
operation. The process evaluation should also explore whether there are any 
barriers to successful implementation of the Act 
2) to undertake an outcome evaluation to examine the impact the legislation has 
had on attitudes and behaviour of football supporters (and by extension to 
assess the impact of the Act on offending).  
1.32 A key aim of the qualitative strand of the work was to assess the 
implementation of the legislation and to identify factors that may be impeding its 
„effectiveness‟, as well as how it was experienced by key stakeholders – 
supporters, police, sheriffs and others. The qualitative research also complemented 
the survey of football supporters by addressing the following specific sub-
objectives: 
 to evaluate whether the atmosphere and behaviour at and around football 
matches has improved since the introduction of the Act; 
 to examine supporters‟ perception of the legislation, in terms of their 
understanding of its content and their acceptance of its objectives; 
 to examine whether supporters view the legislation as being implemented in a 
way that is clear, fair and consistent.  
1.33 The survey of football supporters carried out in August and September 2013 
was followed by a second survey at the end of the 2013-14 season. In combination, 
these allowed an engagement with the following specific issues: 
 the prevalence of certain types of potentially offensive behaviour at football 
games; 
 the prevalence of potentially offensive behaviour in 2012-13 and 2013/14 
compared to previous football seasons;  
 opinions on what type of behaviour at football is offensive;  
 how authorities are dealing with potentially offensive behaviour at football 
compared to previous seasons;  
 how easy or difficult it is for people to agree on what constitutes offensive 
behaviour at football;  
22 
 levels of awareness of laws related to offensive behaviour at football enacted 
in spring 2012, amongst football supporters. 
1.34 Finally, in addition to the survey the evaluation involved analyses of police 
arrest statistics and crime reports to examine the sorts of cases that are being 
targeted for prosecution and to help assess the impact of the Act.  
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2. Methods 
2.1 As noted in the introduction, the evaluation had three main elements: survey 
research with Scottish football supporters; qualitative interviews with key 
stakeholders; and secondary analysis of existing data sources. Each of these 
elements is described in more detail below. 
Surveys of Scottish football supporters 
2.2 Two online surveys of supporters of Scottish football clubs were conducted 
as part of the study. The first survey was „live‟ between 20 August and 20 
September 2013 and the second between 22 July and 5 August 2014.  
Sampling strategy 
2.3 The strategy for sampling supporters of Scottish football clubs relied on the 
assistance of Supporters Direct Scotland (SDS). SDS has created a network of 
Scottish football supporters who wish to debate issues related to Scottish football, 
via its „Scottish Fans‟ forums and social media streams. At the outset of both 
surveys, every supporter in the SDS network received an emailed invitation to take 
part in the survey by clicking on a hyperlink. 
2.4 At the time of the first survey launch, the SDS network consisted of 4,875 
supporters. At the time of the second survey launch, the SDS network consisted of 
approximately 9,000 supporters41. 
2.5 The use of the SDS network yielded a number of advantages: 
 SDS encourages supporters of Scottish football clubs who play at all levels to 
sign up to its network. This meant that the survey invitation email was sent to 
supporters of all the 42 SPFL clubs (and responses were subsequently 
received from supporters of all 42 clubs). 
 The SDS network included both season ticket holders and non-season ticket 
holders, giving access to a wider range of perspectives than would have been 
possible through club records (had these been available to the research 
team). 
Limitations of the methods 
2.6 Given the resources available, an online survey was considered the most 
appropriate method of data collection. A number of other surveys of football 
supporters have been conducted using similar approaches, including the Scottish 
National Football Survey.42 43 
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2.7 When surveying a specific section of the population, such as supporters of 
Scottish football clubs, it is difficult to create a sampling frame from which to select 
a statistically representative sample of that population. For example, there are no 
centrally-collected administrative datasets listing supporters of Scottish football 
clubs and it would be impractical to use the Post Office Address file (PAF) to screen 
for football supporters at randomly selected households. 
2.8 The sampling and data collection methods used for both surveys were 
considered the best available, given resource and other constraints, and allowed for 
the collection of data from supporters of all 42 SPFL clubs, as described above.  
2.9 However, it is important to note that these samples were not a random 
probability sample of Scottish football supporters in general, as only those who 
were signed up to the SDS database were sent the survey link. Indeed, some 
supporters received the link from somewhere other than SDS, meaning that not all 
survey respondents will have been SDS network members. 
2.10 The views of SDS members (and non-members who were forwarded the link 
to the survey) may be considered a reasonable proxy for those of Scottish football 
supporters in general, although the characteristics of SDS subscribers are likely to 
be distinctive in a number of important respects. For example, those signed up to 
SDS will necessarily have access to the internet and are likely to have a reasonable 
degree of ICT literacy.44 Because of the broader character and patterning of 
internet access and use, it is likely that the profile of SDS subscribers may be 
younger and slightly more affluent than that of Scottish football supporters as a 
whole. It is also likely that SDS subscribers will have a greater interest in following 
and engaging in debate around issues affecting football clubs and football 
supporters (given the site‟s establishment of a „fans forum‟ and use of social media 
to keep subscribers up to date with developments in the game). These 
characteristics are also likely to apply to non-SDS members who were forwarded 
the survey link by other means. Conversely, some highly-engaged supporters 
deliberately distance themselves from the SDS network, seeing (rightly or wrongly) 
its part-funding by Scottish Government as compromising its independence. In 
these cases the evaluation has drawn on more qualitative approaches to capture 
the perspectives of these groups. 
2.11 When conducting analysis based on comparing survey responses from 
supporters of different clubs, we do not claim that the views of those surveyed 
represent the views of the entirety of the fan bases of those clubs. However, we 
feel that differences and similarities in views between the supporters of certain 
clubs is worth exploring, particularly where a reasonably high number of supporters 
of a club responded to the survey. 
2.12 Despite these caveats, the sampling strategy used has resulted in survey 
responses being received from supporters of all 42 SPFL clubs and an almost even 
split of season ticket holders and non-season ticket holders, in both surveys. As 
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such, and while acknowledging its limitations, it provides a workable basis for 
hypothesising about the views and experiences of Scottish football fans in general. 
Data analysis techniques 
2.13 Simple frequency tables have been used to show the prevalence of 
supporters that have witnessed particular behaviours, had particular experiences 
and hold certain opinions. Crosstabulation has been used to explore whether 
witnessing these behaviours, having these experiences and holding these opinions 
has an association with belonging to certain social and football related demographic 
groups. 
 2.14 The analysis in this report is based on the answers of participants who 
completed the survey in its entirety. There were 1,945 such responses to the first 
survey and 2,185 responses to the second survey. Not all participants were asked 
every question because participants were routed on the basis of their answers to 
certain questions. „Don‟t know‟ responses to particular questions are excluded from 
the results referred to in this report. Although it is inappropriate to provide response 
rates, as it is impossible to say how many people had access to the survey, the size 
of the responses suggest a high level of interest and engagement. 
Sample characteristics 
2.15 The vast majority of those who completed both surveys were male (93% – 
2014 survey), gave their ethnicity as white Scottish (89%) and were born in 
Scotland (91%). These figures are in line with other surveys of Scottish football 
supporters (for example, 95% of participants in the Scottish FA‟s 2012-13 National 
Football Survey were male)45. It is doubtless the case that women, those born 
outwith Scotland and supporters from minority ethnic backgrounds are under-
represented. There was greater diversity within the sample in terms of age, as 
illustrated in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Age of survey participants                                                  2014                       
  
Age  
 % 
Up to 29 17 (-2) 
30-49 43 (-) 
50-64 33 (+1) 
65 + 7 (-) 
Base 2185 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
N.B. Twenty two under 16 year olds participated in the survey.  
N.B. Figures do not always add up to 100% because of rounding 
 
                                         
45
 http://www.scottishfa.co.uk/resources/documents/ScottishFA/Survey/survey pdf.pdf 
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2.16 The Act is particularly concerned with behaviour that is „likely‟ to cause public 
disorder by expressing hatred based on religion and as such the religious 
background of survey participants is of interest. The religious background of 
participants (Table 2.2) appears to be broadly in line with that of the Scottish 
population as a whole: in the Scottish Census of 2011, 37% of people described 
themselves as having no religion, 32% as belonging to the Church of Scotland, 
16% as being Roman Catholic, six per cent as belonging to another type of 
Christian religion and three per cent as belonging to another religion, while seven 
per cent did not give a response to the census religion question46. 
 
Table 2.2 Religion of survey participants                                            2014 
Religion   
 % 
None 49 (-) 
Church of Scotland 26 (-3) 
Roman Catholic 16 (+2) 
Other Christian 4 (-) 
Other religion 1 (-) 
Prefer not to say 3 (-) 
Base 2185 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 
 
2.17 Although survey responses were received from all 42 SPFL clubs, as 
expected, those from Scotland‟s two largest cities, Glasgow and Edinburgh, 
comprised four of the five most-represented clubs. However, distribution across 
these clubs was not necessarily in line with the size of their respective fan bases. In 
particular, it is notable that supporters of Hearts were almost as numerous in the 
achieved sample as those of Rangers, while Celtic supporters were considerably 
more numerous than Rangers supporters. Of those clubs where more than 100 
supporters responded to the survey, six out of the seven played in the Scottish 
Premiership during the 2013/14 season. Somewhat unexpectedly, St Mirren was 
the fifth best represented club in the 2014 survey, showing a substantial increase 
on the 2013 survey. The reason for this increase is not clear.   
 
Table 2.3 Club supported                                                                       
2014 
Club supported  
 % 
Celtic 19 (+3) 
Rangers 11 (+2) 
Hearts 11 (-4) 
Hibernian 9 (+3) 
                                         
46
 http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/en/censusresults/bulletinr2.html 
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Table 2.3 Club supported                                                                       
2014 
St Mirren 9 (+5) 
Aberdeen 6 (-1) 
Motherwell 5 (+2) 
Other teams 31 (-9) 
Base 2185 
N.B. Individual clubs listed where responses received from over 100 club supporters  
N.B. The names of the four leagues which form the SPFL changed at the beginning of the 2013-14 season. As this report focuses on 
supporters‟ experiences of attending matches played in the 2012-13 season, the names of the divisions as they were known in the 
2012-13 season are referred to in this report. 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
 
2.18 There was a fairly even split between those who were season ticket holders 
for all or part of the 2013-14 season (60%) and those who were not (40%). Of those 
who were season ticket holders, 67% had held a season ticket for over 10 years. 
There was variation in the number of home games attended by supporters, over 
half (53%) attending 16 or more games and over one-fifths (22%) having attended 
five or less home games. Unsurprisingly, attendance at away games was less 
frequent, with 60% of supporters attending five away games or less, and 11% 
attending 16 or more away games. 
2.19 Other questions sought to identify different „types‟ of supporters, including 
which people attended home games with, whether they usually sat in an area of the 
stadium reserved for families and how that area of the stadium compared to others 
in terms of noise level. In 2013-14, only a small minority of respondents (11%) 
watched home games from a section reserved for families. Forty-five per cent of 
supporters watched home games from a section they felt had about the same noise 
level as other parts of the stadium. The remaining supporters were split almost 
evenly between those who sat in quieter (27%) and louder (28%) parts of the 
stadium 
2.20 Supporters were most likely to report attending home games with adult males 
(70% doing so), with one-fifth (20%) attending with adult females. 18% of 
supporters reported attending home games with males aged under 16 years old; 
only six per cent reported sometimes attending games with females in the same 
age group.  
Qualitative research 
2.21 The qualitative research focused on a number of inter-related questions:  
 To what extent are fans and stakeholders aware of the provisions of the new 
Act, and to what extent do they understand and support these provisions? 
 To what extent is the new Act working, both in terms of being supported by 
appropriate club and criminal justice practices, and in terms of the legislative 
provisions adding value in terms of securing appropriate convictions and 
restrictions? 
 To what extent is the new Act perceived to be impacting on fan behaviour?   
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Sample coverage 
2.22 The research involved an extensive series of in-depth interviews and focus 
groups (1-3 hours in length) with key stakeholders involved in the policing or 
conduct of Scottish football, as well as with fan groups themselves, and with 
journalists responsible for providing coverage of football and football-related issues. 
Key stakeholders were – in part – identified through early consultation with the 
Scottish Government, Supporters Direct Scotland, and Police Scotland.  
2.23 In conducting focus groups with groups of fans we sought to elicit their 
understanding and their perceptions of the Act, but also to gauge their perceptions 
of change in behaviour and atmosphere since the introduction of the Act.  In 
addition their perceptions of how the Act has been practically enforced at different 
grounds and fixtures was also a concern.  Finally, in selecting focus groups we 
looked to supplement data being collected via the survey, in particular reaching 
fans who were considered under-represented on the SDS mailing list (in particular 
younger supporters, and supporters who might be self-styled „ultras‟ or members of 
„singing sections‟). In selecting fan groups to look at we developed a „measurement 
footprint‟ to help guide our choices. This was partially informed by selecting key 
clubs and rivalries that were associated with past issues of disorder or 
offensiveness, while also ensuring that clubs in at least the top three flights of the 
Scottish leagues were represented.47 We also used existing research on fan 
typologies (in particular Crabbe et. al, 2006) to inform our recruitment of 
participants to help ensure that we heard from the different types of fans. Finally, in 
addition to formal interviews and focus groups we also held one meeting with SPFL 
officials. 
2.24 The following interviews and focus groups were undertaken: 
Police Scotland 
Interviews with seven members of FoCUS 
Interviews with seven football intelligence officers (including Rangers and Celtic) 
Interviews with four match commanders 
Other criminal justice personnel  
Interviews with three procurators fiscal 
Interviews with eight Sheriffs (with follow-up communications with three of these 
Sheriffs) 
Interview with a defence solicitor 
Clubs and league officials 
                                         
47
 In the event we talked to fans from teams in the first four flights of the Scottish leagues.  
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Interviews with three club security officers 
Interview with one stand safety manager 
Interview with one fan liaison officer 
Fans and fan groups 
Meetings with representatives of various supporter‟s organisations, and 
representatives from the campaigning group, Fans Against Criminalisation 
(FAC)48 
Focus group with two groups of Rangers fans 
Focus group with two groups of Celtic fans 
Focus groups with four other fan groups (three single-team affiliated, one mixed) 
Journalists 
The research aimed to interview a number of key journalists, both sports 
journalists, but also those home affairs journalists who had covered the issue 
from the perspective of sectarianism. Eleven journalists in total were 
approached, six of whom replied and expressed some interest. However, 
ultimately, no formal interviews were conducted. 
Licensed premises and match day observations 
2.25 In addition to formal interviews and focus groups a more informal set of 
interviews with bar and pub staff was undertaken at two locations in Glasgow, 
covering fourteen pubs in total.  The intention was to gauge staff perceptions on 
changes in fan behaviour in and around the premises, as well as to gauge their own 
understanding of the Act, and the policies they had in the premises for dealing with 
potentially offensive behaviour. These interviews were complemented with a limited 
exercise in match day observations, with two fieldworkers attending matches at 
these two locations, observing atmosphere and behaviour on the way to stadia, in 
pubs and bars either side of the fixture, and in the stadia itself during the match.  
This exercise was too limited to provide data on changes in match day behaviour in 
and of itself, but was intended to help inform and triangulate data collected from 
other sources. 
 
 
                                         
48
 Our meeting with representatives from FAC was not used to formally collect evidence, but the 
representatives gave us a broad overview of their experience of the Act and indicated the kind of evidence 
which they had collated. 
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Limitations of the qualitative research  
2.26 Though ultimately the research achieved a high level of fan input and 
representation, there were a variety of access issues in relation to the qualitative 
element of the research as a whole: 
 Some fan groups were suspicious of the evaluation because it had been 
commissioned by the Scottish Government, although over time we did make 
inroads with the majority of these groups.  
 Recruiting fans more generally for focus groups, particularly fans who were 
not followers of Celtic and Rangers, proved problematic and time consuming. 
The principal reason for this did not appear to be any principled reluctance, 
but rather simply that the Act was less of a pressing concern for other fans. 
 Likewise, although interviews were conducted with all the Football Liaison 
Prosecutors and a number of sheriffs, others declined to come forward - 
again, less because of any principled reluctance to be involved, and more 
simply because they had not dealt with any OBFTC charges. 
 Though we accessed a reasonable number of fans in the 18-21 age range 
through focus groups, we did not attempt to systematically access individuals 
under the age of 18. We cannot therefore assess the extent to which fans 
under this age may have a distinct view, or a unique set of experiences, when 
compared to the slightly older fans accessed in our focus groups.  This relates 
to a wider ambiguity through this research in relation to what age categories 
were being referred to when respondent‟s talked about „young supporters.‟  In 
many instances it appeared that individuals in the „late-teens‟ to „early 
twenties‟ age-bracket were being alluded to, though in some instances cases 
were discussed which involved individuals under the age of 16.   
 The most problematic group to access was journalists, none of whom 
ultimately participated in the research. This may in part be because after the 
introduction of the Act, and in the absence of any Rangers-Celtic fixtures, that 
the issues involved were no longer of immediate interest.   Nevertheless, 
given the grievances that many fans and indeed officials had with journalistic 
representations of fans and fan behaviour (and in their view, frequent 
distortions and exaggerations), and given that some journalists got directly 
involved in submitting evidence to Parliament in the run-up to the Act, this 
reticence is regrettable.  
Administrative data 
2.27 In addition to the main survey and qualitative fieldwork we also examined 
secondary data sources to gain a perspective on the impact of the Act in terms of 
trends in recorded incidents of crime and charges for relevant offences categories. 
Of equal importance, the secondary data allowed us to more systematically 
scrutinise how the Act was being enforced in terms of who was arrested, for what, 
where, and on what charge, as well as subsequent court disposals and sentences.  
The main data published and unpublished sources for this work were as follows: 
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 Statistics published by the Scottish Government detailing trends and patterns 
in hate crime offences (notably s. 74 offences, i.e. offences aggravated by 
religious aggravation as defined by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003) 
and in those charges made specifically under s. 1 of the Act. These 
publications were predominantly based on data provided the Crown Office 
and Procurator Fiscal Service. 
 Access to, and re-analysis of, anonymized case data held by the Scottish 
Government, based on records by the Crown Office. This data covered both 
s. 1 and s. 74 charges. 
 Published national statistics on recorded crime in Scotland. 
 A re-analysis of charge data collected by the Football Banning Order 
Authority, a unit now located within FoCUS, though previously hosted by 
legacy Strathclyde police.  
 2.28 None of these data sources was comprehensive or indeed free from 
methodological weaknesses, though when combined with each other, and 
with other data sources collected as part of this evaluation, they provide a 
very useful additional source of evidence.   The strengths and weaknesses of 
each data source are discussed during the course of the report. 
 
The Evaluation and the Review 
2.29 The Scottish Government‟s commitment to review the Act may include 
reference to material other than this evaluation. This evaluation is however 
intended to provide material that may contribute to that review alongside other 
evidence, perspectives or material that the Scottish Government may choose to 
draw on. With that in mind, it may be helpful to summarise briefly what the 
evaluation can, and cannot, tell us about the impact of s. 1 of the Act thus far: 
 The timing of the evaluation, which took place relatively shortly after the 
introduction of the Act, has some bearing on what can be realistically 
concluded about the Act‟s reception and impact. There has been a limited 
amount of time for case law to fully explore and test the legal provisions 
contained in s. 1.  The limited evaluation period also constrains the extent to 
which we can draw definitive conclusions about trends in football-related 
crime and disorder. 
 The evaluation has been based on the best available data sources, but there 
are other potentially relevant data that we were not in a position to access.  
For instance, a recent decline in the s. 1 conviction rate raises questions that 
could not be resolved through this research.  Whether this decline is due to a 
change in the characteristics of cases being prosecuted, or due to issues of 
insufficient evidence, or due to other factors associated with the legal 
arguments made in courts, remains unclear at this stage.  
 In assessing the impact of the Act other work could also be done to 
understand emerging issues – for instance, the experience of people arrested 
under the Act (especially in relation to the precise circumstances of arrest) 
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and how the implementation of the Act interacts with evolving strategies for 
policing and stewarding football.  
 A more strategic question that remains to be addressed is how changes to the 
policing and stewarding of football following the introduction of the Act relate 
to broader considerations of fandom and the commercial prerogatives of the 
Scottish game.      
2.30 In summary, this evaluation was not intended or able to arrive at definitive 
conclusions as to the overall success or failure of s. 1 of the Act to date. What it can 
hopefully offer is robust evidence on patterns of implementation, perceptions on 
impact, and emerging issues and questions in relation to s.1 related practices and 
interpretation.   
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3. The legislation and its implementation in practice 
 
3.1 This chapter examines the introduction, targeting and experience of the 
legislation, both through the eyes of officials but also through the experience and 
perceptions of football fans. As will become readily apparent through this chapter, 
the implementation of the Act cannot be discussed in isolation from how it is 
implemented and enforced.    
Police and club officials: Awareness and training 
3.2 The Act came into force in March 2012, and a notable feature of its 
introduction was that charges under the Act very quickly followed. This rapid uptake 
was unsurprising given the aforementioned investment in criminal justice 
„infrastructure‟ in the previous twelve months.  
3.3 This investment ensured that training and awareness-raising of wider 
agencies and stakeholders was far advanced by the time of the legislation‟s 
enactment. Unsurprisingly, police and club security officials interviewed for this 
research had a reasonably confident grasp of the legislation and its implications, 
and many had taken opportunities to be briefed on the Act by police officers from 
FoCUS.  
3.4 Though police officers expressed various degrees of support for the Act, and 
varying levels of appreciation for the initial operational activities of FoCUS, a 
substantial majority acknowledged that the operational implications of the Act had 
been effectively communicated both through various forms of briefing and direct 
training (often provided by FoCUS) and via email, web communications, and in 
particular via FoCUS‟ e-learning package.   
3.5 Although some police officers questioned whether section 1 of the Act added 
anything new to the powers available under prior legislation, other officers talked 
about the Act as providing a new simplicity and therefore a new clarity – particularly 
around sectarian behaviour and offensiveness – that had been previously lacking.  
before there was ridiculous ambiguity because invariably a lot of things boil down 
to being a breach of the peace that's...is it a breach of the peace, is it not?  It 
depends what way the wind was blowing etcetera etcetera, a million and one 
factors and interpretation and discretion on the part of the police, whereas the 
legislation has now fine-tuned things dramatically so that there's still degrees of 
ambiguity on occasion but in the main it‟s negated all of that (middle-ranking 
Police Officer).  
3.6 Whereas under prior legislation the prejudice element of an offence was 
often only seen as practically enforceable as an offence when combined with the 
accused clearly posing some direct threat to order49, under the new legislation 
                                         
49
 It should be noted that under pre-existing legislation, namely s. 38, a conviction did not require 
the police to provide evidence that the appellant had actually affected anyone.  In the case of 
Rooney v Brown it was determined that even the arresting police officers did not need to be 
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some officers felt that the very act of publicly expressing an offensive sentiment 
was in, and of itself, denounced as unambiguously wrong and unlawful.  
Breach of the peace is breach of the peace what we were doing for the first time 
is we were criminalising sectarian behaviour, that in itself is a success for 
me…[….] you‟ve actually turned them into outcasts, you‟ve been far more 
explicit.  (Senior Police Officer) 
there is a clear line there… it‟s pretty straightforward…if you sing anything that‟s 
offensive and it‟s clearly of religious, sectarian background then you are going to 
get arrested‟ (Club security official) 
3.7 It is this element which was viewed by many of our police respondents as 
distinguishing section 1 from both the section 38 offence and common law breach 
of the peace.  
3.8 It was also thought that this new clarity made it easier for officers to write 
police reports that clearly linked the behaviour witnessed to the relevant legislation.  
I know there has been a lot of critics out there about the legislation and stuff like 
that but I feel it's better for us, it's more...um...there in your face you can see 
exactly where everything fits and it all fits quite neatly into each subsection of the 
different categories under the offences, under the charges (middle ranking, 
Police Officer) 
3.9 Progressing cases was also considered to be much simpler because there 
was no longer the perceived need to justify charges by demonstrating that remarks 
made within a stadium posed a real risk of provoking disorder, or linking the 
remarks to an identifiable individual who would testify to being offended. Moreover, 
some offensive words or gestures which were associated with celebrating or 
supporting terrorism or terrorist organisations, but which were difficult to prosecute 
under either breach of the peace or section 38, now clearly fell within the ambit of 
the new legislation.  
we discussed some of the songs with the fiscal before the legislation came in 
um...and unfortunately due to the fact that it was in support of terrorist groups it 
was hard to fit it into that Section 38 or a breach of the peace um...but when the 
new legislation came in then that just...fitted in, it was perfect (middle ranking 
Police Officer) 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
affected: „it did not matter that the officers were not themselves in a state of fear or alarm.  The 
appellant‟s remarks were likely to cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm‟ 
(https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/search-judgments/judgment?id=6da6a1a6-8980-69d2-b500-
ff0000d74aa7).  However, for a variety of pragmatic considerations (see Hamilton-Smith and 
McArdle 2013 for a fuller discussion), pre-Act policing of such behaviour in stadia tended to focus 
on cases where either a clear threat of disorder could be evidenced, or where the offender was 
attempting to exhort others around them to join in the offence (i.e. they were acting in the capacity 
of a ring-leader). 
35 
3.10 However, both fans and police officers in particular detected varying levels of 
ability among frontline officers‟ skills in applying the legislation, and in having a 
nuanced understanding of sectarian issues. Although FoCUS officers were present 
at most high risk football matches in the year following the introduction of the 
legislation, and indeed this intensity of enforcement activity was widely noted by 
respondents, some respondents questioned whether the same degree of attention 
and expertise was being paid to offensive behaviour occurring at lower-risk 
matches and outwith the stadia.  
Whilst there‟s been a push to challenge it in the football stadia, there‟s been 
nothing in the environs where in actual fact if I was in the underground coming 
here, or in a bus going to Celtic park, or in any other crowd and that was ongoing 
that would be much more terrifying for me. If I come (into the ground) and I can 
hear someone singing a song way over there, to be honest with you it doesn‟t 
even affect me (Club security official) 
3.11 A frequent fan complaint was that inexperienced police officers were also 
making inconsistent and/or erroneous judgements on what was, and was not, 
offensive under the legislation, acting in effect as the stand-in for the „reasonable 
person‟. Although the legislation was seen by many to provide a clear message that 
sectarian offensiveness was wrong, what the legislation did not do was clearly 
specify when behaviour crossed a threshold to become offensive. Some fans had 
raised concerns about the legislation to their MSPs and had been told that it was for 
the police to make that determination; conversely, some police interviewees were of 
the view that this task was one for politicians and not for them. In fact, as a more 
experienced officer was quick to note, it is for the courts to make this determination 
and to interpret what would be offensive to a „reasonable person‟. Nevertheless, 
this did not remove the difficulty for frontline officers in quickly deciding whether an 
act or speech within the context of a football match was likely to be interpreted as 
such by a court:  
It's really quite challenging because you have to make a judgement but you won't 
know for months down the line and it might be the court says no actually...that 
doesn't fit, it's not offensive, or it wasn‟t likely to incite public disorder etcetera 
etcetera. But the good thing is, with … the vast majority of the common 
behaviours now there have been convictions […] so it's not just „the police 
picking on people‟ now. You can't follow that argument anymore because the 
courts have actually decided (Football Intelligence Officer)  
Fan awareness and perspectives 
3.12 Given the rapid uptake in use of the Act, the relative intensity of police activity 
around the Act in the first year, and the controversy that some of this activity 
generated among some fan groups, it is unsurprising that basic fan awareness of 
the Act was high. In our survey, over four-fifths of supporters (83%) had heard of 
the Act (see Table 3.1). Awareness of the Act was greater in 2014 than in 2013, 
although some of this may be due to an increase in awareness caused by 
participation in the 2013 survey. Supporters of Rangers and Celtic had significantly 
greater awareness of the Act than supporters of other clubs, on average. 
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N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
 
3.13 However, despite general awareness of the Act being high, many supporters 
did not feel that they had a deep level of awareness of what it involves (see Table 
3.2). Just under a third of supporters who had heard of the Act (27%), said they 
knew a lot about it, with just over two-thirds (69%) saying they knew a little. Celtic 
and Rangers supporters felt that they had a greater in-depth knowledge of the Act 
than supporters of other clubs, on average. Celtic supporters, in particular, 
expressed deeper knowledge, with over half of those who had heard of the Act 
(52%) saying they knew a lot about it. 
 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
 
3.14 However, although general awareness of the Act was high, detailed 
awareness did appear to vary, and fans were often of the view that neither police 
nor club officials presented them with enough information to give them a sufficient 
Table 3.1  Knowledge of OBFT Act by club supported 
(2014) 
 
Have you read or heard anything at all about the Offensive Behaviour at Football 
and Threatening Communications Act before now? 
 
 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Bases 
Club supported    
Celtic 94 
(+5) 
6 (-
5) 
423 
Rangers 92 
(+9) 
8 (-
9) 
249 
Other clubs 79 
(+5) 
21 (-
5) 
1513 
All clubs 83 
(+6) 
17 (-
6) 
2185 
Base   2185 
Table 3.2 Depth of knowledge of Act, by club supported (2014) 
How much would you say you know about the Act? 
(asked of those who report having heard of the Act) 
 
 
 
A lot 
% 
A little 
% 
Nothing 
% 
Bases 
Club supported     
Celtic 52 (+17)  47 (-14) 1 (-3) 397 
Rangers 34 (+7) 62 (-8) 4 (+1) 228 
Other clubs 17 (+2) 77 (-4) 5(+1) 1196 
All clubs 27 (+7) 69 (-7) 4 (-) 1821 
Base    1821 
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idea of what was, and was not, acceptable behaviour.  Fans talked about pre-match 
announcements and match programme „inserts‟ being so general, unspecific and 
„automated‟ as to be unnoticeable, a view shared by some officials:  
there‟s not been I would say any direct communication with fans in that respect, 
there‟s just been a general „disclaimer‟… for want of a word (Football Intelligence 
Officer ) 
3.15 However, there was evidence of good practice at some clubs, with one 
respondent from a recently promoted team referring to how good the club was in 
providing the fans with tailored information in a booklet about their new rivals, and 
how being drawn into certain types of „banter‟ with them could risk sanction (Fan 
Focus group 7).  
3.16 More general fan complaints that the police failed to communicate with them, 
and in particular that FoCUS failed to reach out to fans and that it simply launched 
into a punitive stage of enforcement, were not borne out by interviews with some 
other police officers and club officials who noted that FoCUS had in fact offered to 
meet fan groups to explain the legislation and their policing tactics:  
Now, to be fair to FoCUS and other senior officers they have spoken with groups 
that are willing to listen to them. They‟ve explained their filming policy, they‟ve 
explained their destruction of films policy, they have… gave them an insight into 
what they are required to do in terms of the legislation, what they should sing, 
what they shouldn‟t sing to.(Club security official) 
In the early days of FoCUS there was an education phase, it wasn‟t just instance 
criminalisation, but very few people paid attention. A couple of games there was 
no enforcement, people were just warned that with the new legislation they would 
be charged. But people didn‟t take it on board. (middle ranking Police Officer) 
3.17 Some fans, similarly to many officials, questioned the practical value of the 
Act in terms of adding anything – in technical terms – to pre-existing legislation. 
Nevertheless, they appreciated its symbolic significance: 
is it necessary given the other criminal offences that can be committed? And 
strictly, it‟s probably not, you could probably sanction that behaviour before. But 
now it‟s explicit and the numbers are going to add up. And it‟s going to become 
very visible who the perpetrators are, and what it is that‟s happening. Because … 
although it‟s quite broad, it pins it down to...more than breach of the peace. – 
(Fan Focus Group 4) 
3.18 Regardless of the quality of communication, our survey shows that a large 
majority of supporters view it as offensive to sing songs about people‟s religious 
backgrounds or beliefs, with around 85% of all fans agreeing in both survey 
sweeps. Even more people, 90% in 2014, agree that songs celebrating loss of life 
are offensive, though fewer think that political gestures are offensive (60%)  82% of 
fans find it offensive when supporters sing songs in support of terrorist 
organisations. 
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3.19 Supporters‟ views about more general behaviour at football matches were 
varied and nuanced but also largely stable between 2013 and 2014, where the 
same question was asked in both years (see Table 3.3). For example, in 2014, a 
small majority of supporters (55%) reported sometimes being offended by things 
they hear at football matches, while half of supporters agreed with the view that 
„people go to football matches to let off steam and what they say should not be 
taken seriously‟.  
 
Table 3.3 Agreement with statements on behaviour at football (2014) 
Whether agree with statement 
 
 
 
Strongl
y agree 
% 
 
Slightly 
agree 
% 
 
Neither 
agree, 
nor 
disagree 
% 
Slightly 
disagree 
% 
Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Bases 
Statement about behaviour at 
football 
      
„Sometimes I‟m offended by things 
I hear other supporters shouting, 
chanting or singing at football 
matches‟ 
19 (+2) 36 (-) 15 (-) 11 (-1) 20 (-) 2175 
„People go to football matches to 
let off steam – what they say 
should not be taken seriously‟ 
12 (-1) 38 (+3) 12 (-4) 19 (-) 19 (+1) 2169 
„Sometimes I worry about the effect 
of other supporters‟ behaviour (or 
language) on people I go to football 
matches with‟ 
10 (-) 26 (+1) 24 (-) 14 (-1) 26 (-) 2158 
„It is offensive to sing, chant or 
shout things about people‟s 
religious background or beliefs at 
football matches‟ 
69 (-1) 16 (+1) 7 (-1) 4 (+1) 4 (-) 2174 
“I find it offensive when supporters 
sing songs in support of terrorist 
organisations” 
73 (N/A) 9 (N/A) 9 (N/A) 3 (N/A) 6 (N/A) 2166 
“I find it offensive when supporters 
sing songs which glorify or 
celebrate events involving the loss 
of life or serious injury”  
 
80 (N/A) 10 (N/A) 5 (N/A) 2 (N/A)  3 (N/A) 2166 
“I find it offensive when supporters 
make political gestures at football 
matches”  
 
40 (N/A) 20 (N/A) 17 (N/A) 8 (N/A) 15 (N/A) 2153 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
 
3.20 Regardless of the quality of communication, our survey suggested that there 
was a clear degree of agreement across the wider fan group regarding the sorts of 
behaviour which could be viewed as offensive. 
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Table 3.4 Whether it is offensive to sing, chant or shout things about 
people‟s religious background by club supported (2014) 
„It is offensive to sing, chant or 
shout things about people‟s 
religious background or beliefs 
at football matches‟ 
 
 
Strongl
y agree 
% 
 
Slightly 
agree 
% 
 
Neither 
agree, 
nor 
disagree 
% 
Slightly 
disagree 
% 
Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Bases 
Club supported       
Celtic 65 (-) 17 (-) 8 (-) 5 (-) 5 (-) 420 
Rangers 35 (-7) 25 (+4) 18 (-3) 9 (+3) 13 (+3) 249 
Other clubs 76 (+2) 14 (+1) 5 (-1) 3 (+1) 2 (-2) 1505 
All clubs 69 (-1) 16 (+1) 7 (-1) 4 (+1) 4 (-) 2174 
Base      2174 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey 
 
3.21 Rangers and Celtic fans demonstrated distinctive attitudes to whether certain 
types of songs or chants were offensive. Three new questions relating to attitudes 
about potentially offensive behaviour were asked on the 2014 survey (see the 
bottom three categories in Table 3.3). For instance, Rangers supporters were less 
likely to think that it was offensive to make comments about religious background 
(60%) compared to supporters of all clubs (85%). Conversely, Celtic supporters 
were much less likely to agree that is it is offensive to sing songs in support of 
terrorist organisations (47%) compared to supporters of all clubs (82%) and make 
political gestures at football matches (2850%), compared to supporters of all clubs 
(60%) – see tables 3.5 and 3.6).  
 
Table 3.5 Whether it is offensive for supporters to sing songs in support of 
terrorist organisations (2014) 
“I find it offensive when 
supporters sing songs in 
support of terrorist 
organisations” 
 
Strongl
y agree 
% 
 
Slightly 
agree 
% 
 
Neither 
agree, 
nor 
disagree 
% 
Slightly 
disagree 
% 
Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Bases 
Club supported       
Celtic 32 15 22 11 20 416 
Rangers 76 9 8 2 5 249 
Other clubs 84 8 5 1 2 1501 
All clubs 73 9 9 3 6 2166 
Base      2166 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
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 In table 3.6 this figure adds to 29% - the difference is due to rounding 
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Table 3.6 Whether it is offensive for supporters to make political gestures at 
football matches (2014) 
“I find it offensive when 
supporters make political 
gestures at football matches” 
Strongl
y agree 
% 
 
Slightly 
agree 
% 
 
Neither 
agree, 
nor 
disagree 
% 
Slightly 
disagree 
% 
Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Bases 
Club supported       
Celtic 18 11 12 13 47 415 
Rangers 43 19 22 6 10 246 
Other clubs 46 23 18 7 6 1492 
All clubs 40 20  17 8 15 2153 
Base      2153 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
 
3.22 These tables evidence distinct patterns based on the club-allegiance of 
respondents.  The songs that Rangers fans were most resistant to stop singing 
were considered (by police officials in the qualitative research) to be mostly 
offensive to other people‟s religious background or ethnicity (i.e. relating to „Irish-
Catholicism‟), whereas the songs that Celtic fans were most resistant to stop 
singing were either viewed as „political‟ and/or songs that were seen as directly 
celebratory of terrorist organisations or individuals who had been involved in 
terrorism.  
3.23 Although some of the songs, chants and gestures made by Rangers and 
Celtic clearly fell within the category of offensive behaviour as defined by the Act, 
others were more problematic and more disputed.  There were several clear areas 
of disagreement as to where the boundaries lay between acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour.  Although in our focus groups with Rangers and Celtic 
fans, most respondents disapproved of extreme songs and lyrics, there were also 
certain „borderline‟ songs which some clubs and fans alike viewed as acceptable 
even though the police were seen to be branding them as „sectarian‟. The two main 
types of ambiguity focused on songs, chants or displays that made some mention 
of organisations or movements that, at some point, could have been associated 
with sectarian terrorist organisations, but which at other points in time could have 
been associated with either legitimately political or otherwise legitimate 
organisations. The second type of ambiguity (often intertwined with the first) was 
expressing a cultural identity in a form that could not be shown to directly 
communicate any hatred or opposition to another‟s culture, ethnicity or religion, but 
which could be construed as offensive simply because that cultural identity was 
viewed as provocative or „oppositional‟ by others. For some this amounted to 
criminalising legitimate expressions of identity: 
If you‟re no‟ doing anything that‟s...we keep going back to sectarian or racist or 
homophobic or anything like that...then there‟s nothing the matter with being 
different from the next supporter. There‟s nothing the matter with having different 
views and different songs and celebrating different cultures. These things should 
be celebrated. (Fan Focus group 1) 
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The legislation had been designed to tackle the extreme ends of criminality; 
whether it‟s sectarianism or racism or general abusive behaviour in all its forms. 
[…..] The problem seems to be…the grey area in the middle. The legislation, by 
its design, allows the authorities to look at that grey area and draw conclusions in 
their view whether it‟s worthy of prosecution or not. And that to me has been a 
problem. (Club security official) 
3.24 Because Parliament had decided not to provide a definitive list of offensive 
songs, gesture or words, clubs had shied away from trying to provide definitive 
guidance to their fans for fear of either advising as „acceptable‟ behaviour which 
might be illegal, or alienating fans through definitively labelling as „offensive‟ songs 
viewed by them as acceptable. However, although early in the evaluation some 
respondents claimed that fans were consequently genuinely uncertain as to 
whether a particular song, flag or set of words might, or might not, fall within the 
remit of the Act, in practice, there seems to have been little real confusion amongst 
fan respondents about what actions were likely to run the risk of prosecution. Fans 
did not in many instances agree that certain activities should fall within the purview 
of the legislation; but there seemed to be little doubt that singing the song in the first 
place would risk police attention and possible arrest. 
3.25 Even where fans did view many of the traditional Rangers and Celtic 
supporters‟ songs as problematic now, there was still opposition to legislation which 
criminalised fans who sang them. In the view of a number of respondents, the 
songs had been on the wane anyway and efforts to replace and marginalise them 
pre-dated the legislation. There was also a commonly-expressed resentment 
voiced by Rangers and Celtic fans that the focus of the legislation was on Rangers 
and Celtic, when other fan groups were seen as being similarly offensive on 
occasion, without being similarly targeted (the behaviour of some England fans in 
the recent international fixture against Scotland being a case in point51). Another 
argument cited by some supporters is that they believe the legislation undermines 
freedom of speech; they do not believe that particular songs/chants/banners (which 
they believe are being targeted) are offensive or sectarian but are in fact a 
legitimate expression of particular identities. Certainly, the figures presented below 
do partially support the contention that the policing is heavily focused on these two 
teams52, and although it is not possible to determine whether this concentration of 
enforcement is proportionate to the level of „offensiveness‟ across Scottish football, 
certainly focus groups with other clubs‟ fans elicited many examples of equivalently 
offensive songs and chants, but also a common contention that offensiveness 
outside of Rangers and Celtic fixtures was, regardless of the precise content, not of 
the same order of seriousness.  
A lot of football songs are banter, are really funny …[…..] Yes! […]… And when 
they cut you to pieces, you get really annoyed, but you can‟t help but snigger. 
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 During the game, England fans were heard to be singing abusive „anti-IRA‟ chants within the 
stadia, though no reports were made to Police Scotland at the time.  See „Seven arrested after 
Scotland v England‟ Herald Scotland, Wednesday 19th November 2014. 
52
 Though a counter argument might be that the level of arrests at Ibrox and Parkhead are 
proportionate and merely reflect the much larger fan bases associated with these two clubs.  
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Because do you remember when XXX were playing XXX they all started singing, 
„All the XXX are Gay‟ [Yeah] And you know, „oh it is homophobic‟. […..] 
the banter that can go back and forward between football fans, and you can hear 
them singing things, and you think “God I wish we had thought of that one!‟ 
[laughter] And it is brilliant and it is funny and it can be cutting. Sometimes it is 
pretty close to the edge, it is not PC. […..] 
What I would say with the Old Firm is there is nothing like that, it always comes 
back down to the same stuff about stupid Irish battles, and this and that and the 
next thing. And you think, „get lost!‟ (Fan Focus group 5) 
Legal understanding and interpretation of the Act 
3.26 Sheriffs and fiscals were asked how they had first become aware of the 
legislation and what training if any they had received. Some had had formal 
training. Most interviewees focused on gaining personal experience and sharing 
knowledge, whether informally or through online judicial resource networks. Several 
of the sheriffs and fiscals were football supporters themselves; others had been 
taken to observe matches and the match policing and said that this had been 
particularly helpful. In Glasgow there is sharing of knowledge among sheriffs, who 
highlight aspects of legislative areas in which they have a particular expertise. One 
specialist in football banning orders53 has prepared briefing papers that are now 
available on the judicial intranet. 
3.27 Sheriffs and fiscals were also asked what behaviour they thought the 2012 
Act was targeting, and what „sort‟ of fan the legislature had had in mind. Again, 
views varied. The fiscals focused on the need to target large-scale disturbances 
and capturing ringleaders of violent disorder and offensive group singing and group 
chanting (not just „sectarian‟ behaviours), and emphasised their role in developing a 
consistent prosecutorial practice across Scotland, particularly as regards the 
interpretation of songs and the requesting of football banning orders. Consistent 
interpretation of songs did not however mean that there would always be the same 
decision to prosecute. One fiscal said that they might decide to prosecute for 
instance where a bar had become known to the public as a „no-go‟ area, but if the 
same songs were being sung in a „bar in Oban‟ and were not disturbing the 
community, it might be sufficient in the first instance to have words with the landlord 
or customers. The prosecutorial decision would depend on the basis of what the 
harm was to people within that community. 
3.28 Fiscals emphasised that they were encountering cases not just of 
„sectarianism‟ or religious bigotry but also of other problems such as organised 
violence, homophobia and racism, although it was not generally felt that the latter 
two were widespread among fans, but rather concentrated in a minority.  
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 A football banning order is a „preventative order‟ that may accompany a criminal sanction (such 
as a fine or a community sentence).   
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3.29 The fiscals were supportive of the legislation and its surrounding 
mechanisms, such as FoCUS: they said that it had enabled the fiscal service to 
work more effectively on a long-running problem and liaise more closely with the 
police. „Generally, working with the legislation and being aware of its criticisms I 
prefer it to the alternatives. It gives a stronger focus around behaviour at football‟ 
(Fiscal 2). The hardest cases, they found, were not surprisingly the songs cases: „I 
think that the offensive singing in particular is one that has been problematic and 
challenging and probably will continue to be because there are different 
interpretations of some of the songs. Some of them are more obviously offensive 
than others, and I think we‟ll need to keep testing those kinds of cases.‟ (Fiscal 1) 
There was little enthusiasm however among fiscals and sheriffs for creating a list of 
banned songs, appealing as this would be. As one fiscal said, „the idea of providing 
a list is incredibly attractive but impossible. If you have illegal ones you‟ll quickly 
come up with ones that are similar but which aren‟t on the list.‟ (Fiscal 3) 
3.30 Sheriffs predominantly expressed some support for the Act, mixed with 
criticism. One sheriff strongly praised it: „I‟m very supportive of what the Scottish 
government is trying to do about this‟ (Sheriff 5); another said „I don‟t have any 
problems with it coming in.‟ (Sheriff 4) One was emphatically critical: „it is 
completely unnecessary, a ridiculous over-reaction and a wrong reaction which 
allowed the people who caused the trouble to avoid responsibility  and turned the 
attention to the supporters. The Rangers players and their manager were the ones 
responsible … it‟s extraordinarily restrictive and far-reaching‟ (Sheriff 7). Another 
felt it was an unnecessary response to pressure from UEFA, and an unwarranted 
restriction on the singing of traditional football songs (Sheriff 2). The others were 
critical of elements but supportive of its purpose: „I don‟t really have a problem with 
the Act in principle … it does have its good bits – in principle it is no bad thing to 
have legislation which tells people if you engage in incidents of overtly sectarian 
behaviour‟ (Sheriff 6) and „it‟s a valiant attempt to try and do something and I think 
you have got to be slow and steady and sensible about policing it.‟ (Sheriff 1) Even 
its unpopularity with the press was cited by one sheriff, who was supportive of the 
Act, as having the valuable effect of „keeping the spotlight on the issue … so many 
people don‟t attend football matches and really have no idea what the behaviour is 
like, that I think it is quite helpful for it to come back into the public consciousness‟ 
(Sheriff 5). 
3.31 The two main criticisms sheriffs expressed were of the statutory wording and 
of a lack of discretion. The legislative language attracted a variety of disapproving 
observations by the sheriffs, not all of which can easily be reconciled. One said, for 
instance, that he considered most of section 1 to be clear but found the phrase „an 
expression of hatred‟ difficult to interpret and argued that this made it difficult for 
fans to identify what songs should be excluded: he would prefer that the section 
was simply phrased as in section 1(2)(e), „behaviour that a reasonable person 
would be likely to consider offensive‟. Defining „hatred‟ was however what 
concerned him most: „most of the expressions are well explained‟ but „that is a very 
difficult thing to prove. Because what you actually get are expressions of sentiment.  
It might be bad sentiment; it might be wrong sentiment; but what sort of evidence 
do we need to convert that sentiment into hatred?‟ However, he felt that the number 
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of problematic cases being heard was so small that it was not a significant problem 
for the courts (Sheriff 2).  
3.32 In contrast, another sheriff objected strongly to the phrase „behaviour that a 
reasonable person would be likely to consider offensive‟ and said that „the way in 
which the Appeal Court has defined 1(2)(e) creates extraordinary restrictions on 
freedom of thought and expression.‟ This concerned him because, he said, in 
practice this part of the section („behaviour that a reasonable person would be likely 
to consider offensive‟) was being used more often to prosecute than the parts which 
had received more publicity („expressing hatred‟, „stirring up hatred‟ and „behaviour 
motivated by hatred‟). He also criticised as too wide the Appeal Court‟s 
interpretation of the requirement that conduct „would be likely to incite disorder‟ 
(section 1(5)(b)): „(it seems) if you sing a song in Dingwall which would provoke a 
sectarian hothead in Glasgow were he to hear it, that will suffice‟. (Sheriff 7) 
3.33 Another pair of contrasting views can be seen in two sheriffs‟ discussion of 
the term „in relation to a football match‟. One described it as „Draconian, potentially 
incredibly broad‟ (Sheriff 6); another said that „it has to relate to “a football match”, 
not just “football”, so having an argument about football, about a particular team, 
isn‟t covered. So the offence has to relate to a specific game, not the game in 
general or an opposing team in general. But (the s 51(3)) qualification does not 
exist in England – it is enough that it relates to a football match, and to me that is 
more sensible.‟ (Sheriff 7) It is not that the sheriffs are in conflict. Rather, any legal 
term may need to be broad for one purpose and narrow for another, making the 
choice of language no easy matter. 
3.34 The lack of discretion in implementing section 1 concerned two of the 
sheriffs. One supported having the legislation but said that it was essential that 
some discretion remained with police and fiscals: „what we‟ve seen in other 
contexts is … no discretion by police or fiscal, and then cases coming up to court 
which are just laughable, which would set the whole thing back. I‟m not saying it‟s 
happened yet, in the context of this legislation, but I think that‟s where you have got 
to be very careful about it.‟ (Sheriff 1)  
3.35 The only case that has clarified the law in this area is MacDonald v Cairns54, 
which illustrates the very wide breadth of section 1. The Appeal Court ruled that the 
sheriff had misdirected himself when he dismissed the case on the grounds that the 
respondent had not offended anyone present, and that no-one would have been 
incited to an act of disorder on the basis of what he was singing. The Appeal Court 
stated that „if the police officers were able to recognise the song and hear the 
words, other persons must also have been able to do so‟, but it emphasised that it 
was not necessary for anyone likely to be incited to disorder to be present. In its 
view it was not relevant to the question of whether there had been a contravention 
of section 1 that particular persons in a football ground could not actually hear the 
words being sung. „In other words the actual context within which the behaviour 
occurs is not determinative‟ (para 12). The section created a new offence with, as 
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 MacDonald v Cairns [2013] HCJAJ 73 https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/search-
judgments/judgment?id=113686a6-8980-69d2-b500-ff0000d74aa7  
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the Appeal Court noted, „an extremely long reach‟. Although sheriffs who regularly 
hear section 1 cases said that most involved pleas of guilty, so the evidence was 
not contested, „borderline‟ offensive singing cases were considered challenging 
because of the question of how to interpret the impact of the songs. The guidance 
from Cairns will be helpful in that regard. Clearly, some traditional songs, when 
sung without any additional lyrics or verses, could be said to have no words that 
directly express hatred, but much depends on context. Football rivalry is often 
creative and can mutate rapidly. A message of bigotry may be conveyed by 
something as subtle as a brief gesture or a meaningful pause where words are 
implied but not sung. This presents a difficulty for law because communities‟ 
perceptions of what is banter and what is hatred may shift over time, and not all 
acts of antagonism are sufficiently offensive that they should be deemed to cross 
the criminal threshold. Deciding this will depend on several factors, ranging from 
the sheriff‟s general or local knowledge, to the current banned status of a particular 
song at a particular club. So, as one sheriff emphasised, if sheriffs are to apply 
section 1 consistently, they require not just guidance from prosecutors and appeal 
decisions, but a consistently high quality of evidence from witnesses.  
Targeting of the Act 
3.36 Outside those matches involving either Celtic or Rangers, most police 
respondents felt that the Act had made little difference to the categories of 
behaviour that were the focus of policing. Although the legislation was clearly being 
used, it was simply being applied to behaviour that previously would have been 
prosecuted as breach of the peace or section 38.  
3.37 With regards to the new offences created by the Act, it was felt that they were 
being applied to behaviours specific to Rangers and Celtic fans - or at least specific 
to matches involving one of these clubs. A number of officers spoke of the potential 
for other fan groups to make offensive remarks or sing offensive songs but only on 
the occasion of playing one of these teams. This targeting of the legislation at 
Rangers and Celtic fans was very much supported by some, who felt the Act‟s 
enactment was almost exclusively a response to the behaviour of those teams‟ 
fans.  
3.38 This is view is supported by official figures which show that charges brought 
under the Act have primarily focused on behaviour associated with supporters of 
Rangers and Celtic. Over half of all OBFTC charges in 2012/13 and in 2013/14 
were against supporters of these two clubs (57% in 12/13 down to 51% in 14/15). 
(Skivington and Mckenna, 2014, p. 6) - though Celtic fans also represent a high 
proportion of „affiliated55‟ victims as well, with 44% of all victims being affiliated to 
Celtic. Clearly, however this concentration of charges is partially accounted for by 
the much larger numbers of supporters following these clubs, and historical figures 
would suggest that the concentration of charges associated with these two clubs is 
not new to the Act.  For instance under the Act, Celtic and Ibrox stadia accounted  
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 „affiliation‟ does not imply that there was a specific identifiable victim, or that the victim was in 
some way affiliated to the club in a formal capacity, just that the offence was clearly aimed at Celtic 
supporters.  
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for 21% and 16% of charges respectively (ibid, p. 11). However, charges at football 
stadia before the Act in 2011-12 under section 74 charges (religious hate crime), 
whilst fewer number, were proportionately even more focussed on these two 
locations (both 22% of stadia charges – see Goulding and Cavanagh, 2012, p.  12).  
3.39 The focus on behaviours most commonly associated with Rangers and Celtic 
is also reflected in the fact the majority of s. 1 charges primarily related to either 
speech or singing, though there was also a notable decline in the extent to which 
these behaviours underpinned s. 1 charges between 2012-13 and 2013-14.  In 
2012-13 offensive speech and singing were present in 137(51%) and 112 (42%) 
respectively56, of the 268 charges made (Skivington and Mckenna, 2014, p. 8).   In 
2013-14 this had declined to 72 for speech (35%) and 75 for singing (37%) of the 
203 charges made (OBFTC report p. 8). The majority of s. 1 charges also fell under 
those aspects of the legislation most synonymous with issues around tackling 
sectarianism,  with 56% of charges in 2012-13, and 51% in 2013-14 clearly 
focussed on hate crimes relating either to religion57 (40% & 30% respectively), or 
crimes relating to support for terrorist groups, or celebrating loss of life (17% & 
28%) (Skivington and Mckenna, 2014, p. 7). 
3.40 Consistent with perceptions about the impact of the Act, a number of police 
respondents were of the view that arrest figures on match days had not risen since 
its introduction, though some felt that more arrests were leading to formal charges. 
One senior officer, conversely, was of the view that under the Act initially, in 
particular with the additional police resources provided by FoCUS, levels of arrests 
had gone up, until the point where fans started to change their behaviour:  
So to begin with they [FoCUS] helped us out, we were getting two or three 
arrests more than we would have done… singing came down (Senior Police 
Officer) 
3.41 The fiscals also felt that the Crown and the police were liaising well under the 
new Act, and that as a result there were more successful prosecutions.  However, a 
difficulty of judging the effectiveness of the legislation in terms of successful 
prosecutions is that there is no precursor legislation, for which published statistics 
are compiled, that we can use to readily compare with the subsequent performance 
of s. 1 charges. Precursor charges under breach of the peace and section 74 of the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (offences aggravated by religious prejudice) 
cover a much wider set of behaviours and contexts than the particular challenges of 
football-related offending. However, a tentative comparison can be made if we 
examine figures compiled by the Football Banning Order Authority (now located 
alongside FoCUS).  
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 There is some overlap between different these categories as a single charge could incorporate a 
number of different elements of offensiveness, e.g. a person could be charged both for singing an 
offensive song and making an offensive comment during the same incident. 
57
 Though the majority of hate crimes relating to religion were presumably associated with abuses 
directed at Catholicism or Irish-Catholic identity, clearly some of this offending also relates to 
offensiveness targeted at other religions (e.g. Judaism, Islam etc.). 
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3.42 The figures detailed here are submitted by police divisions to the Football 
Banning Authority and relate to the main charges against individuals inside stadia, 
but also charges identified in wider police divisional areas that were assessed as 
being related to a football fixture (e.g. an incidence of disorder in a public street or 
in a pub between football supporters).  Though rigorously collected and compiled, 
these figures are not directly comparable to official statistics in so far as they are 
charges (not just concluded cases or convictions), whilst offences are mostly coded 
using police offence categories (breach of the peace, police assault) rather than 
describing what final charges are made under which particular piece of legislation.   
The key exception to this is that all s. 1 charges made under the OBFTC Act are 
precisely noted.  As well as s.1 offences, the figures cover breach of the peace, 
culpable and reckless conduct (typically flares or smoke bombs covered under s. 
20 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995), or any other type of 
offence that was linked to a football match, including the various types of legislated 
hate crime58.   The value in these figures is that prior to 2013-14, the range of 
behaviours that may be viewed as „sectarian‟ and which are now heavily targeted 
by s.1 of the Act, were coded as „sectarian‟ or „racial59‟ by the Football Banning 
Authority.  This gives us some insight into how effective the criminal justice system 
was at tackling sectarian offences at football both pre and immediately post the Act.   
3.43 For the purposes of the evaluation we had a limited sub-set of data available 
to compare arrest figures in three, now historic, Scottish police force areas 
(Strathclyde, Central and Tayside) with more recent figures for the same „legacy‟ 
areas since the introduction of the 2012 Act. Figures were used for three seasons 
prior to the problematic 2010-11 season and for approximately60 one and half 
seasons since the introduction of the Act in March 2012. 
3.44 The figures in Table 3.7 below should not be read as providing a directly 
comparable, portrait of how the police and the criminal justice system dealt with 
sectarian behaviour pre and post the Act. Both the legislative framework and the 
policing context are significantly different between these two time periods, so 
precise comparisons would be erroneous.  Moreover, these figures only relate to 
three „legacy‟ police force area. Nevertheless in „broad brush‟ terms the figures in 
Table 3.7 are useful in tentatively indicating a number of patterns of interest: 
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 though these figures exclude more minor offences such as being „drunk and incapable‟ or 
alcohol- related offences covered in the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, or more 
„indirectly‟ related offences such as domestic violence.  The figures do include religious and racially 
aggravated offences which prior to the Act would have been prosecuted under Section 74 of the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 for religious aggravation, whilst racial aggravations could be 
prosecuted under a variety of different legislative instruments, such as Section 96 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998. Precursor legislation also covered offences aggravated by expression of hatred 
on the basis of sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity. 
59
 Racial offences are included here, as before the Act some offences directed at a group or 
person‟s Irish background or heritage may have been coded as „racial‟, though in including this 
category it has to be acknowledged that a number of other racial charges non associated with 
sectarianism will have been counted.  
60
The post-Act figures can only be seen as approximate primarily because insufficient time has 
elapsed for all the charges made during this period to have reached some sort of conclusion in 
terms of judicial outcomes. 
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 The immediate post-Act period in these areas is associated with an overall 
increase in the number of charges brought against football supporters, though 
official figures show that the number of charges brought under s.1 has 
subsequently declined significantly (Skivington and Mckenna 2014)  
 In spite of the initial increase in the number of charges, the proportion of all 
concluded cases resulting in a conviction remains unchanged.   
 The 2012-13 figures in Table 3.7 do show a remarkably quick adoption of the 
legislation in these areas in terms of the proportion of charges brought under 
the new legislation in these first fifteen months rather than the older provisions 
(104 concluded cases or 61% of the total).  In particular s.1 was used for the 
majority of „sectarian‟ or racial charges within only 4 of the 36 successful 
convictions being secured under old powers. 
 
Table 3.7 Football-related charges, convictions and banning 
orders in three areas, pre and post the Act 
Case progress and 
outcome 
Football-related charges in 
Strathclyde, Tayside and Fife, 
September 2006 to May 2009 
(33 months) 
Football-related charges in 
Strathclyde, Tayside and Fife, 
March 2012 to May 2013  
(15 months) 
 Cases committed to 
trial where an 
outcome is noted  
222 171  
(107 cases concluded under the 
s. 1 of OBFTC Act) 
 Cases resulting in a 
fine, conviction, 
procurator fiscal fine 
or admonished  
172 (77%) 132 (77%) 
  Of which…number 
of convictions etc. 
that relate to a 
marked sectarian¹ or 
racial charge   
81 36  
(equivalent to 79 charges over 33 
months) 
 % marked sectarian 
or racial charges 
resulting in no 
conviction etc. ² 
54% 26% 
 % of marked 
sectarian or racial 
convictions leading 
to a Football Banning 
Order  
11% 55% 
¹It is important to note that the marking of offences as „sectarian‟ is a police practice which is not reflected in the actual wording of the 
Act (or under precursor legislation) under which one would instead be prosecuted for a religiously or racially aggravated offence, for 
other hate crimes,  or for supporting terrorism or celebrating loss of life.  
²Typically these case outcomes were marked either as „no proceedings‟, „not guilty‟ or „not proven‟ 
 
 However, whilst s. 1 is readily adopted, the actual number of charges brought 
for sectarian or racial charges (whether brought under new or old legislation) 
does not appear to increase in the immediate post- Act period in these three 
areas.  
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 Importantly, where charges are brought, the proportion of marked „sectarian‟ 
and racial charges resulting in  a successful conviction increases  in the 
immediate post-Act period, with the proportion of such cases failing to lead to 
a conviction more than halving between the pre and post-Act period. Whether 
this reflects the greater ease with which the Act allows convictions to be 
secured, or is rather due to greater police and prosecutor awareness and 
resources being focused on match day offensiveness and disorder, or both, is 
at present unclear. 
 Finally, where a successful conviction is secured for a „sectarian‟ or racial 
charge, a much higher proportion of such cases successfully result in the 
imposition of a football banning order.  
3.45 The figures for „sectarian‟ and „racial‟ offences need to be treated with a great 
deal of caution for two further reasons. First, clearly what behaviours and songs 
constitute a sectarian or racist offence is highly contentious and disputed. Second, 
cases historically have often not been marked as sectarian or racist even where the 
evidence demonstrates that such a marking would be appropriate (see Hamilton-
Smith et. al., 2011). It is not yet clear whether charges brought since the 
introduction of the 2012 Act are subject to similar recording issues. Nevertheless 
some confidence in the indicative usefulness of these figures can be found in 
comparing these figures with published official data. Scottish Government figures 
for s. 1 of the Act in the twelve months between April 2012 and March 2013, 
indicate 25% of s. 1 charges nationally which were proceeded with resulted in no 
conviction (Scottish Government 2014a, p. 81). In comparison our data for these 
three areas between March 2012 and May 2013, albeit including cases which are 
not proceeded with, provides a figure of 26% of cases resulting in no conviction.    
3.46 In spite of this apparent increase in successful prosecutions, there were also 
a number of concerns commonly raised by police and club respondents. These did 
not relate to the principles or content of the legislation, but to how it was being 
interpreted and enforced. Concerns focused on a number of inter-related issues, 
and mostly related to enforcement actions taken against Rangers and Celtic fans: 
 It was claimed by some police and club respondents that because a 
significant proportion of quite moderate fans disagreed with attempts to 
criminalise certain borderline songs, large numbers of fans could still be found 
singing these.  Consequently it was perceived by some police, fan and club 
respondents that charges were often brought quite arbitrarily against one or 
two random individuals within a much larger crowd, on the basis of them 
being most readily identifiable as singing the song (and thus being most likely 
to be subject to a successful prosecution). Fan and club respondents in 
particular felt that younger fans were disproportionately targeted because they 
lacked the „nous‟ to hide their identity. 
 The initial approach taken by some senior officers to charging and arresting 
individuals was seen as especially contentious.  First, the approach to 
evidence gathering, in particular by FoCUS officers, was seen by some fans, 
as well as by a few police officers, as underhand, with officers recording 
crowd behaviour from a considerable distance with hand-held cameras. This 
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rendered officers comparatively invisible to those subject to this form of 
surveillance. Second, rather than confront and arrest individuals at games, a 
number of highly publicised arrests had been made, often many days later, 
and on occasion through morning arrests at individuals‟ homes or on a Friday 
(resulting in custody over the weekend). 
 Even when they were clearly visible, fans and some police officers alike felt 
that this represented a „disengaged‟ style of policing that missed the 
opportunity to positively influence fan behaviour, and to ward off 
misbehaviour, through more direct engagement (see the discussion below). 
 In the view of some police, club and fan respondents the use of the legislation 
was too focused on some borderline – and highly disputed –songs rather than 
on the more obviously offensive songs and on more violent behaviour both 
within and outside the stadia. The exception was the use of flares, which was 
seen by police and club officials alike as a recent problem that deserved 
prioritisation. 
3.47 These concerns were by no means shared by all respondents.  For instance, 
some police officers were adamant that fans were not generally targeted at random, 
though this difference of view may reflect different practices at different stadia or at 
different fixtures. Complaints (predominantly from fans) about delays in arresting 
individuals also conflicted with well-established best practice of not „diving into‟ the 
crowd to arrest individuals during a match (for risk of sparking disorder).  However, 
in these instances some police respondents recognized that arresting individuals at 
the interval or at the end of the match was nevertheless preferable to a more 
delayed response. 
3.48 Available data also does not entirely support the concerns of some 
respondents regarding a focus on more „borderline‟ songs. Whilst there had been a 
small number of high profile cases, an examination of anonymised Crown Office 
case data showed very few s. 1 cases where an offence was proceeded with purely 
on the basis of some of these disputed songs; rather, most incidents involved 
additional actions or forms of offensiveness that were much less ambiguous.   
Conversely, Crown Office statistics do provide some support for the contention that 
young fans are being particularly affected by the legislation. Under the Act in 
2012/13 35.8% (n=96) of accused individuals were 20 or under (for all types 
offence under s. 1) with a large majority (n=197 or over 74%) being under 30 
(Goulding and Cavanagh, 2013, p. 9). By 2013-14 this had risen to 46% (n=95) of 
all accused being under 20, though it must be noted that this proportionate increase 
must be seen against a decline in charges overall, and in particular a decline in 
charges against older fans.61 (Skivington and Mckenna 2014, p. 4).  In comparison 
if we look at the age profile of accused charged under section 74 offences in the 
same year, only 14% of accused are under 20 (Mckenna and Skivington 2014, p. 
11). 
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 Though a number of multiple charges against young fans at one fixture partly accounts for this 
proportionate increase. 
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3.49 However, again, other common elements of fan complaints from those who 
perceived the Act as „Draconian‟ are not supported in official statistics. Crown 
Office statistics, notably, do not support accounts of the Act involving jail sentences 
being commonly imposed upon convicted fans. Only two such disposals were noted 
in 2012/13 under the Act, with a further two such disposals in 2013/14 (Skivington 
and Mckenna 2014, p. 15).  Data from the Football Banning Authority presents a 
similar picture, with only three custodial sentences associated with s. 1 charges in 
their 2013-14 year, of which one of these three charges related to religious 
offensiveness, the other two pertaining to violent conduct.  The same data shows 
that out of 146 convictions in 2013-14 where a disposal is noted (including charges 
made under breach of the peace), only 7% (n=11) resulted in a custodial sentence, 
nearly all for acts of violence.  
3.50  The latest published figures for 2013-14 reveal a decline in the success of 
charges progressed under the Act.  By point of comparison, in 2013-14, in total 
there were 16,252 people proceeded against for breach of the peace, of which 16% 
(2,529 charges), resulted in a not guilty verdict or an equivalent disposal (e.g. not 
proven) (Scottish Government 2014a, table 2a, page 31).  Under s. 1 of the Act in 
2013-14 there were 154 people proceeded against in court, of which 74 charges 
(48% of the total) resulted in a not guilty verdict (ibid, p. 81). This represents an 
appreciable deterioration on 2012-13, when of the 91 people proceeded against for 
section 1, only 25 resulted in not guilty verdicts (27% of the total).   
 3.51 There are a number of competing explanations for this sudden decline in 
successful prosecutions: 
 The Act, after initial clear cut cases, may now be attempting to address more 
difficult, or disputed cases, for instance charges where there is no identifiable 
victim.  Such cases have risen markedly under s. 1 from 48% in 2012/13 to 
58% of all charges in 2013/14 (Skivington and Mckenna 2014, p. 14).   When 
looking at the sub-set of charges relating to offensiveness on the basis of 
religion, only 33% of religious hate crime charges prior to the Act made under 
section 74 had no identifiable victim, whilst this has risen to 78% of similar 
charges made under s. 1 of the Act (COPFS data).  This rises in turn to 85% 
of all such charges relating to behavior in stadia (Goulding and Cavanagh, 
2012– p. 14). 
 The Act has also been used to address more cases where the offensive 
behavior involves alleged support for terrorist organisations or a celebration of 
loss of life. These cases include some of the most legally contested cases 
and account for an increasing proportion of section 1 charges (17% in 
2012/13 rising to 28% in 2013/14) (Skivington and Mckenna 2014, p. 8).   
 They may be issues more generally with managing football-related charges 
that is associated with these conviction figures rather than anything to 
specifically with the Act itself.  For instance delays in getting cases to court 
may be leading to more cases being unresolved.   
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3.52 On this last point, whilst there are no published figures to help explore these 
issues, Football Banning Order Authority figures, again, provide some useful 
insight, as the cases contained on the Authority‟s database are updated on a daily 
basis using access to electronic court records. The evaluation was able to look at 
figures for the whole of Scotland for 2013-14 „football year‟ (i.e. tracking the football 
season, and running from approximately July to June).   Again this database 
contains both s. 1, breach of the peace and other similar football-related offences.  
In this period there were 323 charges, of which 218 (67%) had been resolved (as of 
approximately the 1st March 2015 when we accessed the data).   Of the resolved 
cases, 32% had resulted in no conviction (i.e. an outcome of „not guilty‟, „not 
proven‟ etc.), some way lower than the 48% reported in the published figures for s. 
1 cases only for 2013/14 (Scottish Government 2014a, Annex E, p. 81).  However, 
if unresolved cases in the Authority‟s database are included, 54% of all 
prosecutions had either failed or were unresolved in the 2013-14 „football year‟.   As 
a proportion of the unresolved (or „pending‟) cases were considered likely by the 
Football Banning Authority to have actually been resolved in terms of the case 
being dropped but without the conclusive date being added to the electronic court 
record, this may account for the difference between the two „no conviction‟ figures.     
3.53 As shown in table 3.8, when we compare, exclusively, football-related breach 
of the peace and s. 1 offences, again using Authority data for the 2013-14 „football 
year‟, it becomes apparent that this level of performance, in terms of securing 
convictions, is not particular to the Act, but is in fact common to other football-
related charges, with broadly similar levels of charges resulting in no conviction or 
being incomplete. 
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Table 3.8:   Comparing case progress and disposal for football-
related offences  charged under s. 1 OBFTC and 
Breach of the Peace (source: Football Banning 
Authority, 2013-14) 
s.1 OBFTC – disposals No.  Percent¹  Breach of the 
Peace (BOP) 
No.  Percent 
Conviction 73 48% Conviction 49 45% 
No conviction 36 24% No Conviction 22 20% 
Case pending 43 28% Case pending 39 35% 
Total  152 
 
Total  110 
 
Average days elapsed from date of offcen to disposal (or to 1st March 2015 if case 
pending) 
  
All cases² 274 days (mean) 
 
293 days (median) 
With conviction 
     
S. OBFTC 216 days (mean) BOP 196 days (mean) 
No conviction 
     
S. OBFTC 200 days (mean) BOP 190 days (mean) 
Notes: 
¹These percentages relate to all cases, pending and completed, and therefore are not equivalent to an official 
„conviction rate‟ which measures the percentage of completed cases resulting in a conviction.   
²This estimate relates to all football-related charges (not just s. 1 and BOP charges) with a usable date record.   
3.54 Table 3.8 also includes a sub-set of cases which were either clearly shown 
as incomplete (marked „pending‟) or where the case had been completed and a trial 
date was available.  This enabled us to roughly estimate the time elapsed between 
the date of offence and any subsequent case disposal.   This entailed removing 55 
cases where date information was missing.  For the 268 remaining cases, we 
worked out the time elapsed (in days)62.  
3.55 When we look at the time taken from offence date to sentencing, it becomes 
clear that cases under s. 1 are taking slightly longer than cases under breach of the 
peace to reach some form of conclusion, whilst cases under both types of offences 
are actually taking, on average, substantial lengths of time to conclude.   Whilst, it is 
difficult to judge these timescales in terms of reasonableness, in the absence of 
published figures for similar types of offences in Scotland prior to the Act, even a 
very cautious examination of what published figures are available on trial lengths in 
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 Where cases were unresolved the 1st March 2015 was used as the ‘latest date’ by which we estimated a 
time elapsed figure.  Given that an unknown proportion of the ‘pending’ case will have been concluded, it is 
likely that the estimates for total time elapsed are exaggerated (the mean average time elapsed for such 
pending cases is 394 days, with s. 1 cases having a mean average of 451 days).  Conversely, where cases are 
shown as concluded and only a date for the first court appearance is provided (the ‘intermediate diet’ 
appearance), the earlier date has been used as the conclusive date. Whilst, some of these cases may have 
been concluded at this earlier date (with a guilty plea and immediate sentence) in other instances it is clear 
that the final disposal date is missing, and in these instance the estimates for time elapsed are likely to 
underestimate the real time taken. 
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other jurisdictions would suggest that these cases are taking a comparatively long 
time63.    
 3.56 Thus one possible explanation for the drop in the official 2013/14 conviction 
rate for charges brought under s.1 is that the figures might partially reflect issues 
with a backlog of cases. Whether these timesacles relate to capacity issues with 
the police, the Crown Office, or the Court Service, or in fact are normal and to be 
expected for these types of charges, we are unable to say. Moreover, whether 
these timescales  are likely to be meaningful in terms of impeding the effectiveness 
of the Act is difficult to assess based on current evidence. Whilst classical 
sentencing theory (Beccaria 1963) would assert that delays in sentencing might 
reduce the deterrent impact of a particular penalty, academic studies have failed to 
definitively establish this (e.g. Clark 1988).   
3.57 What cannot be discounted is that slow case progress is likely to impact 
negatively on suspects, as punishment can often be viewed as starting from the 
point of arrest not from the point of sentence (Feely 1977)64.  As will become 
evident below, in this study lengthy case times  added to some supporters‟ sense of 
unfairness, as charged supporters were perceived to be left with a potential 
conviction hanging over them for a long period. Moreover, many accused faced 
stringent bail conditions in the meantime.  For instance, whilst in the 2013-14 
Football Banning Authority dataset, some 57 convicted fans had football banning 
orders imposed on them post-conviction (38% of those convicted), 65 fans whose 
cases were either pending, or whose case ended up with „no conviction‟, had bail 
conditions that included a football banning order or equivalent, or in some instances 
had conditions that significantly exceeded those typical to football banning orders.  
This included 40 (58%) of the 69 „no conviction‟ cases across all charge types.  The 
imposition of such conditions had caused controversy in some s.1 cases65.  
The enforcement of the Act  
3.58 To understand what the statistics tell us about the Act‟s use, the evaluation 
asked question of supporters and officials to gauge their experiences and 
perspectives on how the Act was being implemented.  It should be remembered 
that the data in this section, as it relates to supporters, was taken from qualitative 
interviews and focus groups.  As was discussed in the methods chapter, the focus 
groups were intended to supplement the survey, and whilst some of these involved 
fans who were supportive of the aims of the Act, others attracted fans who were 
opposed to all, or some aspects of the legislation. More generally, the focus groups 
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 For instance, statistics in England and Wales showed that in 2011 the mean time elapsed between the 
offence and case disposal for common assault and actual bodily harm was 127 days, with a median average 
of 94 days (Ministry of Justice 2012). This cannot be used to make a judgment about the efficiencies of 
Scottish processes, as the two criminal justice systems are very different, but regardless of this, the accused 
may reasonably be presumed to feel the effects of slow case progress in similar ways. 
64
 Though we worked out case times from the  data of offence rather than the date of arrest (due to the 
former date record being more complete) in the large majority of cases (circ. 70%) the arrest date was the 
same as the offence date. 
65
 See „Ten Rangers fans in court over alleged sectarian incident‟, BBC News, 9th December 2014.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-30404056 
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attracted fans who were – at the very least – interested in, and therefore to some 
extent critically engaged with, many of the issues raised by the Act.  
3.59 The early stages of the Act‟s implementation was characterised by many 
supporters and officials alike as involving a somewhat „intensive‟ policing approach, 
perhaps unsurprising given the level of political and media coverage in the year 
preceding its introduction: 
Yeah, it just came in and it just came in like a runaway train (Football Intelligence 
Officer) 
it‟s about a shock and awe, front page of the newspapers, and making sure that 
people are challenged (Club security official) 
3.60 Though it was also acknowledged that much of the momentum in terms of 
police and criminal justice responses actually pre-dated the Act with the 
establishment of FoCUS and Football liaison prosecutors in the previous year:   
FoCUS played that part at the time, there was a real political imperative, they 
were being pushed quite aggressively, in a positive sense I suppose, right across 
the country.‟  (Senior Police Officer) 
3.61 Although supporters of different clubs offered varied accounts of experiences 
of policing and stewarding, there was a general consensus that security visibly 
increased at many of the clubs when the Act came into force, most notably at 
Celtic, Rangers, Aberdeen, and Hibs (UB & Student focus group). Interestingly, 
despite the fact that the majority of focus group participants perceived the Act to be 
targeting Celtic and Rangers supporters in particular, the experiences of different 
types of fans converged greatly. For example, at one of the Celtic focus groups 
much discussion centred on the levels of policing within Celtic Park at specific parts 
of the stadium.  
One participant was surprised at how different her experience was from the rest of 
the group: 
I‟ve learned a lot because I‟ve got a different experience from all of you, I travel 
independently, sit in an area of the ground that must be very, very boring, 
nothing ever happens! Nothing, no-one gets talked to, no-one gets lifted! (Fan 
Focus Group 2) 
3.62 Similarly, fans of other clubs spoke of vastly different experiences depending 
on what part of the „home‟ stadium they were located in. Members of a supporters 
group with predominantly young fans described high levels of surveillance: 
Our section at XXXX .. regularly we have two police with cameras in the main 
stand looking on our section, we will have two police with cameras at the back of 
our section looking down, and we will have another police with camera on the 
other side of the stand next to the away fans, pointing back across to us, just so 
they don‟t miss any angle‟ (Fan Focus Group 4) 
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3.63 This was in stark contrast to the other participants who described rarely 
seeing much of a police presence in their stand and were never aware of being 
filmed during matches. Similar patterns emerged from other focus groups, including 
those constituted by supporters of teams other than Rangers and Celtic. Virtually all 
fans agreed that they were policed in a much more intensive manner when part of 
the away support. 
it‟s the three different searches on the way into the ground, it‟s the getting off 
your bus and you‟ve got police either side of you standing with video recorders 
filming every single person as they come of the bus.. in the game it‟s the same.. 
(Fan Focus Group 4) 
3.64 This notion that particular „types‟ of fans (as opposed to fans of particular 
clubs) are treated differently was supported by the police interviewed, who 
described a risk-based approach to policing within stadia: 
That's just the way the police work you know, we target the hotspot areas and 
that's part of a football stadium as well is targeting the right areas (Football 
Intelligence Officer) 
3.65 Unsurprisingly, it was perceived that the „risk‟ groups involved young 
supporters, especially those who could be classed as „ultras‟. It was felt that some 
„ultra‟ members gravitate towards risk (Police Scotland X2) 
Interviewer - The singing section I mean have you...developed intelligence on 
them almost akin to being a risk group or...? 
Police officer - Yeah I mean they are a risk group […]There are different levels of 
risk and you've got...normal supporters, maybe a level one, you've got level two, 
level three, and maybe the high risk level four so everybody fits into that group at 
some point.  You know they all fit into it but um...we can see that some of the 
singing sections are now merging with the higher risk. (Football Intelligence 
Officer)  
3.66 This categorisation of young supporters and „singing sections‟ as risk groups, 
whilst potentially appropriate on occasions, also seemed commonplace and 
potentially problematic, in particular when sections of supporters, who whilst maybe 
having the potential to be offensive, were clearly not associated with more violent 
disorder, came to draw on the scarce police assets and resources normally 
reserved for violent risk groups.  
3.67 Some police representatives interviewed acknowledged that the early 
„intensive‟ approach to policing the Act may have backfired somewhat, causing 
tension between police and groups of supporters (Football Intelligence Officers X 2, 
middle ranking Police Officer). One cause of tension was the reported increase in 
post-match arrests, often days or even weeks after the alleged offence. This was 
driven not by the Act per se, but by the increased use of cameras to provide 
evidence of offensive behaviours. Although it appeared that some fan groups may 
have been exaggerating the prevalence of these „knock at the door‟ arrests to 
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strengthen their arguments against the legislation, the use of these tactics were 
nevertheless frequently raised by fans in focus groups as an illustration of the 
„Draconian‟ enforcement of the Act (Fan Focus Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 & 7).   
3.68 Another source of tension was that individuals arrested at games were 
perceived to be chosen somewhat arbitrarily.  A common theme from the 
supporters‟ focus groups was the issue of hundreds or thousands of supporters 
singing the same song yet police arresting only a small number of people. Of 
course, police representatives spoke of the impracticality of arresting large numbers 
of people, and as noted earlier the supposed target of the Act is those who would 
be considered „ringleaders‟. However, most supporters felt that the police and 
stewards did not seem to be targeting „ringleaders‟ and in fact were pursuing those 
who were easy to „pin down‟ on camera.  
it seems to be a case of well instead of actually policing the situation we are just 
going to let them do what they want and then we are going to drag a couple of 
them out of their beds at four o‟clock on a Sunday morning and drag them into 
court [….] You are more likely to change your behaviour, change what you sing 
in a ground, if there are four of five police officers round about you, in their full 
uniform, than you are if there‟s some wee, snivelling b****d with a camera behind 
you. (Fan Focus Group 7) 
3.69 An even greater issue for many supporters was a concern about the 
disproportionate targeting of young fans. Some older supporters recounted singing 
songs or behaving in a particular way as teenagers that could nowadays result in 
sanctions under the Act. For many, it was considered part of being a young 
supporter, especially a young male supporter, as notions of masculinity were 
emphasised regularly. Learning which behaviours were acceptable and which were 
not was regarded as an important part of growing up: 
I mean, being 15 years old, I remember singing the songs and giving it all the, 
the lyrics, just to antagonise the Celtic fans. And I realised pretty soon after that, 
probably two years after that, probably about 17 before I started actually thinking 
about these things and realised that...you couldn‟t behave, you wouldn‟t behave 
like that outside and being in a football ground didn‟t mean it was suddenly 
acceptable. (Fan Focus Group 6) 
3.70 A key part of this perceived „learning‟ process was considered to be self-
policing amongst support, some of whom would regularly intervene to reprimand 
younger fans for unacceptable behaviours or language. Self-policing was 
emphasised by various fans as the most effective way to rid football of particularly 
offensive behaviours, more effective than legislation in this respect. 
Like I said, it is fading away. If you heard FTP66 back then, you‟d get hundreds, 
thousands of folk joining in.  Last week, you‟d maybe get ten.  And they were all 
blootered (Fan interview) 
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 This is a common contraction representing the insult “F*** the Pope”. 
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I don‟t think young guys should be jailed for being nothing more than a ned, 
that‟s all they are.  When you hear it at the football you normally just hear it once, 
because you normally see a reaction from the crowd saying „that‟s no‟ allowed‟ 
(Fan Focus Group 2) 
3.71 Supporters spoke of a sense of unfairness at what was perceived as the 
„criminalisation‟ of young football fans, and suggested that they were simply seen 
as „easy targets‟ for police and stewards. One older supporter who attends all 
matches, home and away, described an occasion in which he challenged police for 
what he considered to be random and disproportionate targeting of young fans: 
you know Tynecastle when you come up the steps you come under the stand 
and you‟re walking out and it‟s just a mass of bodies.  And almost everybody to a 
man was singing XXXX, everybody including myself.  And there was two police 
officers next to me.  And I‟ll be honest with you, I was deliberately singing a bit 
louder, looking for what might be a reaction because I know the trouble they‟ve 
had up in the other section for singing that song. But these two officers tried to 
squeeze past me and I could see that their target was about three or four 
youngsters that were holding up an Irish tricolour.  I could see that that was their 
target and I blocked them deliberately.  And I eventually said to them, “Do you 
guys have a problem with that flag?” and the guy said “No” and I said “you seem 
to be because it looks as though you‟re engineering your way across there”.  And 
he said “No, it‟s the song they‟re singing”.  I said “But I‟m singing the song.  
Everybody is singing the song.”  What I‟m trying to say with this is those young 
lads were an easy target (Fan Focus Group 1) 
3.72 Even fans that were supportive of the legislation in principle voiced concerns 
that young people are being targeted for behaviours that were at least tacitly 
tolerated for many years, and as such they have grown up considering these as 
„normal‟: 
that‟s where they missed out with the legislation you know it was „this is not 
acceptable and we are cracking down on it‟ and it‟s suddenly us and them…. 
there‟s a lot of them at 16, 17, 18 years of age, and quite frankly are probably, 
poorly educated, you know, their mothers and fathers have sang the song, 
they‟ve been at the football since they were a young kid and they‟ve heard that, 
and that‟s where the challenge goes in, but that challenge doesn‟t need to be as 
Draconian…(Fan interview) 
3.73 Others echoed this unfair targeting of young football fans that long preceded 
them and originated well outside the confines of football: 
The way people think, these opposing fans and their political identities and where 
they come from are very much ingrained within the family. And I think that‟s 
where the Bill [Act] falters, because it‟s very much taking these people who have 
grown up with this ideology and its ingrained in them completely, that‟s what 
they‟ve grown up to do, they don‟t see anything wrong with it, and you are 
trapping them, you are punishing them for the way they have been brought up, 
and it aint necessarily their fault.  Need a much broader approach, broader 
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education.  Why these things are bad, why it‟s not acceptable.  You are setting 
people to fail with this, because you are just saying, you are letting people live 
the way they want until they go to a football stadium then they sing these songs 
and you are arrest them for it (Focus Group 6) 
3.74 The consequences of being prosecuted under the Act were widely discussed. 
Some high-profile cases which were well known due to high levels of media 
coverage were supplemented with stories about young people known to the 
participants. One fan talked about a friend who was „visited‟ and almost charged for 
happening to be holding a flag that was being passed around the section. The flag 
was the “starry plough” and he was, as is common with flags in some fan sections, 
just passing it along above his head when the image was caught.  (Focus Group 6) 
One of the more extreme  examples is captured in the dialogue below: 
…he was filmed at XXXX, in April 2013. And this boy has been due to appear in 
court 4 times. And there‟s 4  police officers that are...he was filmed from the 
trackside, on the upper tier, he‟s the one person that got picked out. And the 4 
police officers, 4 dates and one court date the police officers didn‟t bother to turn 
up. So this is going on and on and on until December he missed a court date. 
And that‟s why he‟s remanded, for missing a court date. But the police failed to 
turn up before, his lawyer‟s failed to turn up before, so by January 2014 this boy 
is lying in a cell. It‟s not even been proven that he‟s guilty... 
–he‟ll probably lose his job 
– and that‟s the downside of this Act. So he‟s appearing on XX  
February for something that happened in April 2013 – what cost? Even the 
justice system is letting everybody down on this. The cost for having 4 dates, for 
having a boy lying inside for 6 weeks. (Fan Focus Group 2) 
3.75 The implications for the young person involved, including the likelihood that 
he would lose his job, were of concern to the majority of supporters involved in the 
focus groups. The perceived failure of the criminal justice system, and the fact that 
the young man was one picked out of a crowd for singing the same song as those 
around him, epitomised the disproportionate targeting of young people. 
 „you look at supporters that‟s going to affect their working lives, in terms of 
you‟ve got to explain to your employer.. „oh I‟ve been arrested under a bill (sic) 
that doesn‟t make any sense, I can‟t come into work on Monday‟. „Why?‟‟ 
Because I‟m going to stand in court for Monday for ten minutes and then got told 
to b****r off‟ (Fan Focus Group 7) 
3.76 Fans differed in their stances on whether issues with policing and stewarding 
would result in them eventually deciding to stop attending football matches. One 
supporter suggested that the treatment of football supporters, including the level of 
surveillance, would not be accepted in any other social activity, and spoke of the 
impact on enjoyment of the game: 
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my neighbour goes to the bingo, she gets in her car, drives over to XXX, goes to 
the bingo and gets home. She has a great time. I come over here and I‟m like a 
criminal, and I‟ve no‟ done anything (Fan Focus group 2) 
3.77 Members of official supporters groups, particularly those which tend to attract 
younger and more „hardcore‟ fans, reported a reduction in members because of the 
threat of the impact on their lives outside of football. Many fans described changing 
the types of games attended, such as attending home matches only as it was 
considered more risky to attend away games (Fan Focus group 1) 
3.78 The issue of clubs not supporting their fans also came up regularly in 
discussions. There was a strong perception that football clubs (some in particular 
more than others) were happy to charge high ticket prices and reap the benefits of 
fans‟ dedication but would generally not  provide support on the subject of 
perceived mistreatment by police and stewards.  
They might as well put over the Tannoy – come in, sit down, shut up and leave 
after 90 minutes, thanks for your money ( Fan Focus group 3) 
Well from my point of view, I love the way the Green Brigade have created an 
atmosphere in this ground.  And I‟ve brought customers here and they‟ve felt that 
experience – they didn‟t watch the game, they were watching what was going on 
– for the right reasons.  And I thought the atmosphere that was created there, the 
displays we‟ve had in this ground and at cup finals, at Hampden, has been 
absolutely brilliant, second to none.  And I just think that had we harnessed that 
and controlled it, and got the maximum from it, we wouldn‟t be having these 
current problems.(Celtic fan) 
3.79 The concern that the legislation was „killing the game‟ by having a negative 
effect on the atmosphere at many matches was also voiced regularly.  
People like it when it goes off like that, there‟s no question about it. When the 
fact that certain Rangers-Hearts games have been quite tame...it‟s a big 
disappointment to me. You prefer it when they‟re lively, a bit mad. I‟m thinking 
about the last time at the tail end of their existence in the Premiership. So it has 
to be acknowledged, I suppose, that people, football supporters like the tension. 
(Fan Focus Group 6) 
Policing and stewarding football: issues of inconsistency 
3.80 One of the difficulties that confronted the effective enforcement of the 
legislation, and frustrated many fans was the inconsistency with which fans and fan 
behaviour were perceived to be dealt with at different stadia.  This is perhaps 
reflected in our survey, where respondents were consistently more negative in 
relation to attending away games than they were for attending games at home (see 
Table 4.1 and 4.2 below) Police respondents recognised this as a historic difficulty 
in the policing of Scottish football, in so far as different police areas and different 
club stewarding operations could not only approach match day policing and security 
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differently, but they could also make quite different judgements about the particular 
level of risk posed by a particular fixture:   
They would decide on the risk of a match but they didn‟t have a process for it and 
because there wasn‟t a process never mind it not being consistent it was based 
on what we've always done for that match - you know, why is it we've got so 
many officers at some places, we've got no officers at other places? (Senior 
Police Officer) 
3.81 For fans this could lead to frustration in terms of away game experiences 
veering between unexpectedly „light‟ and unnecessarily „heavy‟ levels of policing 
and security.  With this uncertainty, came uncertainty about what behaviours were 
and were not permissible at different grounds.   
At XXX my bag got searched 4 times. What‟s happening to us is that every away 
game is different…But all these rules and regulations are set in place, they‟re 
discussed with our security team. But they don‟t communicate that to us, the fans 
that are travelling. (Fan Focus Group 4) 
3.82 This was compounded by a perception that stewards and police officers dealt 
(or did not deal) with behaviour very differently, and this could lead in turn to very 
uncertain outcomes. If nothing else it would appear that different levels of policing 
at different fixtures and the different contexts surrounding offensive behaviour itself, 
could lead to very different outcomes.  For instance, if pre-match assessments 
resulted in a fairly low-key approach to policing, but then the police on the day were 
confronted with a large number of fans singing an offensive song, the outcome 
could be very different from a more heavily policed match with more isolated 
singing:   
So...we've been criticised at court as well saying obviously there's been a stand 
of, for example XXX supporters, at the XXX game singing this song, why have 
you only arrested one?  Well we don‟t know who all these people are for a start, 
there's only two of us there, we can only stop and speak to one or two people at 
the same time.    (Middle ranking police officer) 
3.83 This different approach to policing was seen as frequently leading to unfair 
outcomes and with certain fan groups being more heavily policed than others: 
I find Scotland (the national team) fans offensive with their kilts and nothing 
underneath it. That‟s what I find offensive, walking up there drunk, but they‟re 
allowed to do it and they‟re policed differently again, another example of 
difference. They‟re allowed to drink outside the stadium. (Fan Focus Group 1) 
3.84 This perceived inconsistency of approach was particularly marked when it 
came to stewarding, with fans and officials noting excessively aggressive and over-
assertive stewarding in some stadia, particularly since the advent of the Act, 
contrasting with stewards in many other areas who were perceived to be either 
uninterested or incapable of having a role in policing offensive behaviour: 
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Well I would think half the stewards wouldn‟t have a clue and I would say the 
same for the police, some of them. (Football Intelligence Officer) 
…and this guy turns up and he would be screaming about whatever mistake a 
XXX player made. He would scream abuse at them, and I was like „Wow, wait a 
minute…‟ And he was swearing and it was foul, and some of the stuff he would 
come out with just outrageous against the other side. And I was really 
embarrassed for my children and… 
… [suggestions from other respondent that a steward might intervene]….  
Nah, the stewards, nah the stewards get involved if somebody is standing. And 
they come up to tell him to sit down. When there is stuff like that going on, they 
run a bloody mile.(Fan Focus Group 5) 
Stewarding /policing capacity and capability 
3.85 In spite of the attention given to enforcing the Act in Scottish football stadia, 
aside from the added national resource of FoCUS, the approach to policing stadia 
has broadly continued along the lines of reducing costs by moving towards „police 
free‟, or at least, „police-lite‟ stadia, where stewards have more of a role in 
maintaining safety and order. This move away from a heavy police presence in 
favour of local enforcement strategies inevitably will give rise to the local variations 
in strategy outlined above. Although in no instances were stewards primarily 
responsible for enforcing the Act, their involvement could be critical, whether in 
terms of discouraging fans from misbehaving, or in reporting offensive behaviour to 
the police when it occurred.   Although stewards did appear to be effective to some 
extent in certain areas, fans‟ perceptions of stewards as poorly paid and of low 
status, the perceived frequent turnover of personnel which made it difficult to 
„ingrain‟ an appropriate knowledge of the Act, and the associated shortage of 
experienced stewards, were regarded as combining to produce very uneven 
approaches. Standards of stewarding were seen to veer between the over-
assertive to stewards who either lacked the required knowledge, or interest, to help 
enforce the Act.  These problems were extensively reported by police officers and 
fans alike.   
Interviewer: So, are the stewards essentially not getting on board in terms of 
enforcing the legislation? 
Respondent: Far from it. Would you? Would you if you were Monday to Friday in 
your profession and on Saturdays you decide you want to be a steward and are 
you going to get yourself actively involved in a court case? (Football Intelligence 
Officer) 
3.86 Although police officers were subject, much more consistently, to higher 
levels of training, and had access to extensive guidance and support, the changes 
towards fewer police officers in stadia worked against having a large pool of officers 
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of officers experienced in policing football. As one officer responsible for training 
noted: 
I haven‟t been able to do enough training nationally to satisfy myself that the 
officers...all of the officers that turn up at football are sufficiently trained, that's 
partly because you can't abstract them for an outrageous amount of time and 
also you can't get enough of them that I may train 20 officers at a training course 
one day and then they might be at a football match...six months away. In which 
case some of the training that they've had has been lost!  (middle ranking Police 
Officer) 
3.87 With fewer experienced officers in the stadia and a greater reliance on 
stewards, fans perceived policing to be more disengaged and distant, typically 
finding them in situations of higher risk, standing in section corners or on the 
touchline with cameras. 
Fan 1 – I think the problem with the coppers is they have no leeway. They 
cannae make decisions themselves in the ground, they cannae say to yous two 
„behave yourself, you can‟t sing that‟ 
Interviewer– that‟s a good point because some fans refer back to days of a bit 
more discretion 
Fan 2 – common sense 
Interviewer – have you noticed a change in that? 
Fan 2 – if you‟re given a camera by your boss to go and film somebody you‟re no 
just going to keep it in your pocket, you‟re going to stand there and film and we 
think that‟s where the problem‟s coming from, they‟re looking for it 
Interviewer – do they actually come up and talk to you at all? 
Fan 3  no, if the police come anywhere near you at all during the game you‟re 
getting arrested, simple as that. They‟ll never come anywhere near you, they‟ll 
keep their distance and it‟ll be filming the whole time. (Fan Focus Group 4) 
3.88 Club security officials, some fans and some experienced police officers 
themselves stated a preference for less reliance on stewarding and a more 
engaged style of policing. This did not in some respondents‟ minds imply a 
requirement for more police; rather a smaller, more stable cadre, of officers with a 
good knowledge of a particular fan group, the advantage being that experienced 
officers could spot known individuals who were likely to cause trouble, and could 
ward off trouble simply by being closer to the fan group: 
if they see us (police officers) and we're standing in front of them they won't sing 
the song. I know for a fact that they've sung the song in front of local officers, and 
if you're at (other named clubs) they'll sing the songs with impunity. (Football 
Intelligence Officer) 
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3.89 But this more proactive and intelligence-led style of policing was also 
dependent on a good degree of trust and communication between police officers 
and fan groups, and a number of police officers and club security officials alike 
believed that the fans‟ sense of grievance in relation to the legislation and its 
enforcement had damaged these relationships:  
Is that worth criminalising that person for? And that is something you have to be 
careful with because of course the knock-on effect, the bigger picture of that is 
that you start to have a wedge being driven between policing and football fans 
and the danger really is wider than just the vocal group I mentioned earlier on. 
The danger is the wider support, who if they sense, like any group of people, if 
they sense unfairness or perceive a victimisation they will start to change their 
view on policing as well. (Club security official) 
It‟s [the implementation of the Act] probably eradicated any sort of rapport or 
possible rapport between supporters of Celtic, Rangers and the police, which I 
think for the safe, for making the game as safe as it can be you need some... call 
it a working relationship is the best term, the police need to know where they 
stand with the supporters and the supporters need to know where they stand 
with the police. (Fan Focus Group 7) 
3.90 Caution needs to be exercised however in attributing these tensions solely to 
the introduction of the Act, as whilst some respondents‟ did make a link between 
more confrontational policing and the Act, how the Act was policed was a tactical 
choice, not an inevitability, and some senior officers advocated very different 
approaches:  
If I could sit Celtic fans next to XXX fans…  you go to Murrayfield, and I know it‟s 
a different culture, and perhaps it‟s a different background and society… but I 
think we can move that bit closer to Murrayfield than we actually have,  by 
segregating them and giving them titles, and marching them off for doing this, 
and watching them, and proverbial militias and big vans and mobile supports and 
public order unit.. it‟s nonsense we don‟t have that scale of challenges,  you 
might have for Celtic-Rangers [….] but I think sometimes we just overplay it, and 
that doesn‟t help, it just aggravates the situation (Senior Police Officer) 
3.91 Finally, even where police-free football was seen to be working well, this had 
been achieved within the context of a sustained investment in capable, more 
proactive, intelligence-led policing. In many areas this level of investment was not 
apparent: for instance football intelligence officers were restricted to a very part-
time administrative role that rarely allowed them to attend matches or develop 
intelligence on risk groups. As a consequence judging levels of risk and planning 
effectively for different fixtures became more problematic.  
A lot of the football intelligence officers aren't getting out to actually see who (the 
risk groups) are, so...people can get around that by saying they're just a bunch of 
wee boys that don‟t really get involved in anything but when you actually go and 
deal with them they're not a bunch of wee boys. (Football Intelligence Officer) 
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3.92 Weak intelligence was also associated with difficulties in effectively 
resourcing the enforcement of football banning orders. As bans post-conviction did 
not usually come with any direct measures to ensure compliance (such as some 
sort of „sign-on‟ condition during matches), the only means of ensuring compliance 
(short of spotting the banned individuals in a crowd of thousands) was good 
intelligence on their intention to attend and their likely whereabouts.  
Policing violence 
3.93 Poor police-fan relationships and an under-investment in intelligence were 
seen as particularly problematic because regardless of their support for the 
legislation there was a consistent view amongst police officers from the Central belt 
that more traditional „risk groups‟ had been increasingly active over the 2012-2014 
period in terms of engaging in pre-arranged fighting. Although difficult to support 
with statistical evidence (because many fights remain formally undetected), these 
accounts contrast sharply with accounts given in the previous football banning 
order evaluation back in 2010-11 when police officers were unanimously of the view 
that such risk group activity was at a low level (Hamilton-Smith et.al., 2011). Both 
large and small teams were now identified as having active risk groups, with in 
some instances younger fans „graduating‟ towards membership of risk groups that 
had previously been the preserve of older fans. 
The problems before were less, I think they‟ve got worse now almost it‟s harking 
back to the 70s in terms of the [team X] risk, the risk were calling themselves 
ultras, before just tended to be engaged in pyrotechnics, displays, banners, now 
crossing over to the risk side of things, fighting…(Football Intelligence Officer) 
3.94 Some police respondents felt that both the police and the media were too 
preoccupied with in-stadia issues at the cost of giving due priority to this violence, 
which predominantly occurred well away from the game and the stadia: 
The mass fighting before the XXX game didn‟t make it into the paper, the media 
focus on what happens in the ground. (Football Intelligence Officer) 
the legislation‟s not impacting on them, in fact I see them as more active towards 
each other. That isn't impacting on them because they, the risk groups, I can only 
really speak for XXXX because a lot of …[mentions three different „ultra groups‟] 
they‟re the ones that are getting themselves caught, so the older risk groups 
don't engage in sectarian singing because the way they see it is, I'm not going to 
get caught for that.” (Football Intelligence Officer) 
3.95 Three Football Intelligence Officers alluded to occasions when, due to a lack 
of prior intelligence being provided by officers responsible for visiting clubs, they 
had been confronted with unexpected incidents of disorder.  As one officer noted, 
an under-investment in intelligence could be self-perpetuating, because it could 
effectively lead to officers refusing to recognise that they had a problem in the 
absence of any evidence (thus mitigating the need for any greater policing 
attention).  This point was vividly demonstrated in one interview when the 
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interviewer was shown a publicly available online video, filmed by a local resident 
from their flat window: 
XXXX and XXXX, two teams who have Football Intelligence Officers but neither 
club has a risk group….Allegedly…. 
[sound of video footage in background which shows fans from these two teams 
fighting each other in a residential street]  
Explain to me, what is this? If you're in your house, or if you've got young 
children and that's happening outside your door? Right, watch this. Bof! That kid 
is completely out! Now he's not moving. [young white, male lies unconscious in 
the middle of a road…..]Now I'm sorry, somebody singing a song in a stadium 
[…..]is not at the same level as that … (Football Intelligence Officer) 
3.96 The quality and investment in intelligence assets clearly varied across Police 
divisional areas however, with some determining to maintain a strong investment 
(Senior Police Officer), whilst other areas felt that they had benefited from the 
training resources provided by FoCUS which had allowed them to build up a more 
skilled set of officers available to help with football operations (Football Intelligence 
Officers X2). 
Refinements and innovations 
3.97 Although the Act faced a number of challenges, in particular in terms of the 
context in which it was being enforced, a number of refinements and innovations 
had the potential to ameliorate some of these issues. Principally, many of the 
aspects of enforcement that had disgruntled some fans, and which were particularly 
associated with FoCUS, such as the over-use of cameras and frequent instances of 
retrospective arrests long after a game had finished had – at least in the opinion 
some police and security officers – become less prominent. Although FoCUS had 
initially suffered from being associated (fairly or otherwise) with the politics of police 
reform and mergers - with the imposition of a distinctly „Strathclyde‟ style of 
policing, the Unit over time had come to be seen as a more neutral resource 
servicing Police Scotland as a whole. As FoCUS has developed, it has taken a 
more limited role in terms of actively enforcing the Act at games, preferring instead 
to train local officers in the use of the Act and key enforcement tactics (such the use 
of cameras), while attending games on a more responsive basis (e.g. at the request 
of local match commanders). Some respondents claimed that fans too were now 
less likely to notice FoCUS officers because they were less prominent in the stadia, 
were more likely to be perceived as just members of Police Scotland, and made 
more discreet, and less constant, use of camera equipment: 
now our cameras are very small and discreet so people don‟t actually see them, 
obviously that took a couple of months to get that organised but now we're a wee 
bit more discreet when we're out there.  (middle ranking Police Officer) 
3.98 Aside from training other officers in camera use for evidence gathering, and 
training relating to the Act generally, FoCUS had also taken a strategic role in 
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attempting to improve police capability and consistency.  Indeed the very presence 
of FoCUS at games across the country appears to have indirectly exerted a certain 
scrutiny of different local policing practices, and provided some degree of pressure 
on local officers to police matches to a consistent standard. Other strategic roles 
undertaken by FoCUS included: 
 Acting as a central clearing house for national intelligence, including adding to 
local intelligence „narratives‟ by pulling together a more national view of 
issues.  
 Taking on the role of developing intelligence packages around more 
prominent risk supporters, with the aim in some instances of seeking football 
banning orders.  
  Supplementing local policing capacity when it comes to undertaking more 
extensive or more difficult post-match inquiries, including in many instances 
acting as the go-between between local officers and fiscals when it came to 
preparing cases for court.  
 Promoting other ways of improving decision making around the 
implementation of the Act, notably via the establishment of a „case markers 
forum‟ which aimed to promote shared learning and best practice amongst 
police officers responsible for „marking‟ cases in terms of charging suspects 
appropriately, and submitting evidence effectively.  
 Finally FoCUS was also perceived by other officers to be changing some of its 
practices away from some of the tactics that had particularly incurred criticism.  
Notably, FoCUS had started to work more around non-stadia issues, in 
particular around violence away from football grounds (Football Intelligence 
Officers X2). It had also been active in promoting better case handling to 
avoid situations where suspects charged with comparatively modest offences, 
such as offensive singing or displays, were not unnecessarily detained over 
the course of a weekend: 
Initially, people were getting arrested and they were getting detained in custody 
for singing an offensive song, got kept overnight and then taken to court the next 
day.  We've tried to encourage local officers to release a lot of the arrests on 
undertakings so they're not getting kept in.  (middle ranking Police Officer) 
3.99 A final area of tentative improvement and refinement reported by some 
officials was in stewarding at Rangers and Celtic. For example, at Rangers, 
stewarding had been brought „in house‟ allowing the club to deploy stewards more 
responsively to club needs than had been possible with externally-contracted 
stewards.  A further key change was that stewarding sections were also now 
headed by ex-police officers, mostly of Inspector rank or above, though with each 
regardless having substantive experience in policing football.  The employment of 
in house stewards was also intended to allow for a more stable core of experienced 
stewards to be developed. The premise behind these changes was of having fewer 
police officers in the stadia but a more experienced cadre of stewards, who were 
known to the fans, and would be better placed to proactively monitor and influence 
fan behaviour. 
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4. The impact of the legislation 
4.1 The key challenge in measuring the impact of the Act is that the very fixtures 
associated with its introduction  (namely the derby between Rangers and Celtic) 
ceased to occur after Rangers Football Club PLC went into liquidation, and the 
newly re-formed club joined the Scottish third division for the 2012-13 season.  In 
the absence of these fixtures, any straightforward measurement of trends in 
football-related disorder or offensiveness becomes impossible. Though we review 
police statistics for football related offences in this chapter, our main way of 
assessing the impact of the Act was through our fan survey, and the perceptions of 
fans themselves in terms of changing levels of disorder and offensiveness.  
The fan survey asked questions that were both season specific in terms of the 
prevalence of certain behaviours, first in the 2012/13 season and then in the 
2013/14 season as well as questions about the prevalence of these behaviours 
compared to „previous seasons‟.  
Prevalence of behaviours 
4.2 Of the possible offensive behaviours that we asked about in the survey, by 
far the most prevalent witnessed by home and away supporters was swearing at 
players and officials (see table 4.1 below), witnessed by over 90% of supporters in 
the 2013/14 season. Apart from swearing, the most common „specific verbal‟ 
behaviour experienced was hearing negative references to a person‟s religious 
background, heard by around one-third of both home (28%) and away supporters 
(35%) during at least one game in the 2013/14 season. This was more prevalent 
than hearing negative references to skin colour (8% of home supporters), country of 
origin (19%), gender (10%) or sexuality (19%). 
4.3 The prevalence of these „verbal‟ potentially offensive behaviours experienced 
by supporters was very stable between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 seasons, 
including the more general „verbal‟ behaviour of hearing songs that the supporters 
found offensive. 
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N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
 
4.4 Supporters, particularly away supporters, experienced an increase in „non-
verbal‟ potentially offensive behaviours in 2013/14, compared to the previous 
season (see Table 4.2 below). These behaviours included fighting, letting off flares, 
throwing missiles and the displaying of offensive banners. 
 
Table 4.1 Prevalence of types of behaviour witnessed by home supporters  
during 2013-14 season 
Proportion of games at which behaviour 
witnessed 
 
 
 
All or 
almost 
all games 
% 
Some 
games, up 
to around 
half 
% 
No games 
% 
Bases 
Types of behaviour     
Swearing at players / officials 74 (-3) 22 (+2) 3 (-) 2044 
Swearing at other supporters 38 (+1) 41 (+2) 21 (-3) 2020 
Negative references to a person’s skin 
colour 
2 (+1) 6 (-1) 92 (-) 2032 
Negative references to a person’s religious 
background 
4 (+1) 24 (-2) 72 (+1) 2030 
Negative references to a person’s country 
of origin 
2 (-) 17 (-1) 81 (+1) 2024 
Negative references to a person’s gender 1 (-) 8 (-2) 90 (+1) 2024 
Negative references to a person’s sexuality 2 (N/A) 17 (N/A) 81 (N/A) 2023 
Fighting with other supporters / police / 
stewards 
1 (-) 24 (+2) 75 (-3) 2043 
Letting off flares 1 (-) 54 (+9) 45 (-10) 2053 
Throwing missiles 1 (+1) 24 (+4) 75 (-5) 2040 
Displaying banners that you found 
offensive 
2 (+1) 21 (+3) 76 (-5) 2042 
Singing songs that you found offensive 3 (-) 39 (-) 58 (-1) 2043 
70 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
 
4.5 The greater perceived prevalence of problematic behaviours (aside from 
swearing at officials and players) at away games is not surprising given our 
qualitative findings which consistently found evidence that fans found attending 
away games to be more unpredictable and intimidating.  
You know it‟s more comfortable at your home ground cos you know the group 
round about you and the atmosphere round about, people can chip in and say 
things. But if you go an away match, you‟re not with the same group, maybe 1 or 
2 friends [……] There was a chap next to me smoking, I had to say to the 
steward...So that was away from home. If it had been at home you‟re round your 
own group, you‟d have had a lot of support saying „hey, that‟s enough‟. (Fan 
Focus group 6) 
4.6 The lack of a distinct difference in reported prevalence between the 2012/13 
and 2013/14 seasons is not particularly surprising, in so far as we would anticipate 
that such a relatively „blunt‟ set of measures would be able to register change over 
such a short period. However, when we asked fans to compare current behaviours 
with a more sweeping assessment of „previous seasons‟ some distinct trends 
emerged.  
4.7 In both the 2012/13 and 2013/14 seasons, a larger proportion of supporters 
(home and away) felt that all of the measured behaviours (with the exception of 
letting off flares) were less common than in previous seasons, compared to the 
Table 4.2 Prevalence of types of behaviour witnessed by away supporters 
during 2013-14 season 
Proportion of games at which behaviour 
witnessed 
 
 
 
All or 
almost all 
games 
% 
Some 
games, up 
to around 
half 
% 
No games 
% 
Bases 
Types of behaviour     
Swearing at players / officials 65 (-2) 28 (+1) 7 (-) 1594 
Swearing at other supporters 48 (+1) 37 (+1) 15 (-2) 1586 
Negative references to a person’s skin colour 3 (+2) 13 (-1) 84 (-1) 1574 
Negative references to a person’s religious 
background 
7 (+2) 28 (+1) 65 (-3) 1575 
Negative references to a person’s country of 
origin 
5 (+2) 20 (+1) 76 (-3) 1570 
Negative references to a person’s gender 2 (-) 12 (-) 86 (-) 1562 
Negative references to a person’s sexuality 3 (N/A) 19 (N/A) 78 (N/A) 1560 
Fighting with other supporters / police / 
stewards 
3 (+1) 29 (+5) 68 (-7) 1587 
Letting off flares 6 (+2) 53 (+12) 40 (-15) 1596 
Throwing missiles 3 (+2) 27 (+6) 70 (-8) 1591 
Displaying banners that you found offensive 4 (+3) 24 (+3) 72 (+6) 1592 
Singing songs that you found offensive 6 (+2) 34 (-) 59 (-3) 1594 
71 
proportion who thought they were more prevalent. For example, 40% of home 
supporters felt that negative references to religious background were less common 
in 2013/14 than in previous seasons, compared with only 3% who thought that this 
behaviour had increased. In 2014, over half of supporters felt that the prevalence of 
all these behaviours (apart from letting off flares) was at about the same level as in 
previous seasons. 
 
 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
 
Table 4.3 Prevalence of types of behaviour witnessed by home supporters 
during 2013-14 season compared to previous seasons 
Prevalence of behaviour compared to previous 
seasons 
 
 
 
More 
common 
% 
Less 
common  
% 
About 
the same 
% 
Bases 
Types of behaviour     
Swearing at players / officials 7 (-) 12 (-1) 81 (+1) 2009 
Swearing at other supporters 5 (+1) 19 (-3) 76 (+2) 1956 
Negative references to a person’s skin colour 2 (+1) 39 (-1) 59 (-1) 1804 
Negative references to a person’s religious 
background 
3 (+1) 40 (-1) 56 (-1) 1851 
Negative references to a person’s country of 
origin 
2 (+1) 38 (+1) 60 (-2) 1822 
Negative references to a person’s gender 2 (+1) 35 (+2) 63 (-3) 1792 
Negative references to a person’s sexuality 2 (N/A) 36 (N/A) 62 (N/A) 1798 
Fighting with other supporters / police / 
stewards 
7 (+2) 36 (-) 57 (-2) 1875 
Letting off flares 32 (+2) 21 (-3) 47 (-3) 1905 
Throwing missiles 5 (+1) 34 (-) 61 (-1) 1855 
Displaying banners that you found offensive 6 (+1) 30 (-2) 63 (-1) 1868 
Singing songs that you found offensive 8 (+2) 32 (-2) 60 (-) 1894 
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 N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
 
4.8 These positive assessments of change were stronger for home games 
attended than away games. Again our qualitative research with fans and officials 
alike supported these accounts of positive change.   Even in focus groups where 
fans were adamantly opposed to the legislation, participants acknowledged that 
they had stopped behaving in ways that could lead to a charge under the Act (Fan 
Focus Groups 1, 3 & 4).  Fans were highly wary of the risks of acquiring a criminal 
record for one moment of imprudent behaviour, although the sanction that some 
fans most readily feared was not a criminal sentence per se, but the football 
banning order that might accompany it.   
a banning order hits home.  If I got banned for football for three months, I‟d be 
devastated, I wouldn‟t know what to do with my time.  Because your whole kind 
of social aspect of your weekend revolves around football. [….] I think the 
banning orders are definitely the way forward, I would combine them with a 
social education of some sort. (Fan Focus Group 6) 
4.9 Other fans, whilst acknowledging that there was less offensive behaviour, felt 
that many of these improvements actually pre-dated the Act (Fan Focus group 6). 
4.10 These perceptions of positive change may partially account for an observed 
drop in charges made under the Act over time, with charges dropping from 268 in 
Table 4.4 Prevalence of types of behaviour witnessed by away supporters 
during 2013-14 season compared to previous seasons 
Prevalence of behaviour compared to 
previous seasons 
 
 
 
More 
common 
% 
Less 
common  
% 
About the 
same 
% 
Bases 
Types of behaviour     
Swearing at players / officials 8 (+3) 8 (-2) 83 (-2) 1520 
Swearing at other supporters 8 (+3) 11 (-3) 81 (-) 1513 
Negative references to a person’s skin 
colour 
2 (+1) 32 (-) 66 (-1) 1402 
Negative references to a person’s 
religious background 
6 (+3) 30 (-1) 64 (-2) 1426 
Negative references to a person’s country 
of origin 
4 (+3) 30 (-) 67 (-1) 1414 
Negative references to a person’s gender 2 (+1) 29 (+1) 69 (-2) 1390 
Negative references to a person’s 
sexuality 
2 (N/A) 29 (N/A) 69 (N/A) 1394 
Fighting with other supporters / police / 
stewards 
7 (+2) 28 (-1) 65 (-2) 1460 
Letting off flares 32 (+5) 17 (-1) 50 (-6) 1464 
Throwing missiles 7 (+3) 28 (-) 65 (-2) 1439 
Displaying banners that you found 
offensive 
8 (+3) 25 (-1) 67 (-2) 1437 
Singing songs that you found offensive 10 (+4) 24 (-3) 67 (-) 1456 
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2012/13 to 203 in 2013/14, with the biggest drop being those charges associated 
with offensive behaviour directed towards another person‟s religion (down from 
40% of all charges under the Act in 2012/13 to 30% of all charges in 2013/14)  
(Skivington and Mckenna, 2014, p. 7).  Even when we add the charges made under 
section 74 of the Criminal Justice Scotland Act 2003, the legislation most commonly 
used for such behaviour before the advent of the Act, there is still an observable 
decline in charges over this period (Mckenna and Skivington, 2014, p. 6).  
 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey  
 
N.B. Figures in brackets show percentage point change from 2013 survey 
 
4.11 Given the focus of enforcement of the Act to date on behaviour particularly 
associated with Rangers and Celtic supporters, Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 look 
specifically at the perceptions of these supporters. Here, home supporters of both 
Rangers and Celtic were somewhat more likely to hear negative reference to 
religion in 2013/14, than supporters of other clubs, on average (see Table 4.5). 
However, large proportions of home supporters of both clubs, Rangers (50%); 
Celtic (40%), felt that this type of behaviour was less common than in previous 
Table 4.5 Home supporters hearing negative reference to religious 
background by club supported 
Proportion of games where home 
supporters heard negative reference to 
religious background 
 
 
All or 
almost all 
games 
% 
Some 
games, up 
to around 
half 
% 
No games 
% 
Bases 
Club support     
Celtic 13 (+6) 30 (+3) 56 (-10) 378 
Rangers 11 (+1) 31 (-7) 58 (+5) 229 
Other club 1 (-1) 21 (-4) 78 (+4) 1423 
All clubs 4 (+1) 24 (-2) 72 (+1) 2030 
Base    2030 
Table 4.6 Prevalence of negative reference to religious background 
witnessed by home supporters during 2013-14 season compared 
to previous seasons by club supported 
Prevalence of negative reference to 
religious background compared to 
previous seasons 
 
More 
common 
% 
Less 
common  
% 
About the 
same 
% 
Bases 
Club support     
Celtic 8 (+5) 40 (-11) 52 (+6) 349 
Rangers 3 (-) 50 (-7) 46 (+6) 207 
Other clubs 2 (-) 40 (+3) 59 (-3) 1295 
All clubs 3 (+1) 40 (-1) 56 (-1) 1851 
Base    1851 
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seasons. This perception of improvement was occasionally (and somewhat 
grudgingly) acknowledged by fans of other teams. 
So I suppose it has improved slightly because there‟s less access for the XXX 
fans in particular to behave the way they used to do. But the general attitude, 
there‟s still a very strong element of looking after yourself when you go to XXX 
(Fan Focus group 6) 
4.12 Official respondents though, were less guarded in recognising positive 
changes: 
When we first started [….] it was almost like there was a song timetable and you 
knew at six minutes this tune was going to tune up, just before half time you were 
going to get this song, and after half time you would get some other thing.  
And...you just don‟t get that now. (Football Intelligence Officer) 
A big improvement, personally. No longer are they coming up en masse and 
singing their songs. That‟s  a real boon for us as well.  (Senior Police Officer) 
Having to listen and say „did you hear a peal of XXXX, I think I heard a bit of it.‟ 
Whereas you normally you have a full.. you have the whole lot of them singing it, 
now you get  a few and it gets stopped. (Senior Police Officer) 
4.13 Our own, albeit limited, observational work as part of this study, also found 
limited evidence of offensive singing at both Ibrox and Celtic Park. COPFS data 
provides further tentative support, with charges associated with matches at these 
two venues falling from 73 charges in 2012/13 to 40 charges in 2013/14. 
4.14 However, although there were clear indications of improvements in fan 
behaviour, there were also accounts in our qualitative data of various forms of 
negative adaptation to the risks and controls presented by the Act. This ranged 
from some members of „ultra‟ groups turning to other forms of disorderly behaviours 
such as letting off flares, fighting, and damaging stadia seating (Football 
Intelligence Officers X4) to some individuals continuing to make offensive remarks 
but taking steps to avoid detection (Senior Police Officer, Football Intelligence 
Officer).  
They are aware now it‟s criminal, but they still sing it, but they sing under 
banners etc.   Even in away games they will sing it, and they will sing it in pubs. 
(Football Intelligence Officer) 
4.15 Again, our observational fieldwork and interviews with stakeholders around 
stadia provided some tentative evidence that offensive behaviour was to be readily 
found outwith the stadia on match days, whilst „saving‟ behaviour that might be 
deemed as offensive for what fans judged as „low risk‟ (as in low risk of effective 
enforcement) away games was also seen as a common form of adaptation. 
4.16 Conversely however, there were also indications of more positive changes in 
fan behaviour, in particular an increase in self-policing, at some clubs, by fans.  
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This had been evident before the Act on occasions when clubs qualified for 
European games, and many fans reacted with disapproval to behaviour or displays 
that risked getting their team fined or sanctioned in some other way by UEFA 
(Football Intelligence Officer) but there were also indications of greater levels of 
self-policing in the domestic game generally (Fan Focus Group 1, 4 & 6, Fan 
interviewee) though whether this is attributable in any way to the Act is difficult to 
determine.  
Official data on football-related offending 
4.17 Aside from the perception of fans themselves about changes in standards of 
behaviour in and around football fixtures, the other sources of data that might 
provide some indication of the impact of the Act, include police, crime survey and 
Crown Office data. 
  4.18 Prior research by the Scottish Government (Cavanagh 2011) had shown that 
there was some association between football fixtures, in particular fixtures between 
Rangers and Celtic, and spikes in various forms of criminality and anti-social 
behaviour. Notably anti-social behaviour (typically captured before the Act in the 
offence of „breach of the peace‟), violent crime, and incidents of domestic abuse 
were all associated with these events.  Such spikes did not necessarily testify to 
any unique relationship however between football and crime as the Government‟s 
analyses also demonstrated that other public holidays and large crowd events 
(which all might in turn be commonly associated with the consumption of alcohol) 
were also associated with notable spikes in similar types of criminality.   
4.19 There are also a number of methodological issues with trying to measure 
post-Act changes in levels of violence and disorder at, and around, football.  
Principally, shortly after the introduction of the Act, the reconstitution and relegation 
of Rangers FC removed from the football fixture the key clash that was associated 
with spikes in crime and disorder.   Whilst the two clubs‟ meeting in February 2015 
may have provided some reminder of the crime and disorder issues involved, 
changes in predispositions towards violence and disorder can hardly be gauged 
from one fixture.  
4.20 A brief examination of police statistics and survey estimates from the Scottish 
Crime and Justice Survey show that broader crime trends make it extremely difficult 
to make judgements about the impact of the Act. Both police recorded, and crime 
surveys figures show sustained falls in most of the relevant crime categories, both 
before, and after, the introduction of the Act: 
 Between 2008/09 to 2012/13 violent crime, as measured by the Scottish 
Crime and Justice survey fell, by approximately 25% whilst within that 
category, assaults fell by 24% (Scottish Government 2014b, p.16). 
 Falls in police recorded violent crime were even greater.  In particular in the 
sub-category of non-sexual violent crime, by 2013-14 incidents had reached 
its‟ lowest level since 1974 (Scottish Government 2014c, p. 21) falling by 
approximately 27% between 2008/9 and 2012/13 alone (Scottish Government 
2014c, table 5, p. 59).   
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 Similarly, recorded incidents of breach of the peace fell by 24% over the same 
period, even though this headline offence category included the new offences 
charged under the Act after 2012.  The decline in the offence category 
however predominantly occurred before the introduction of the Act (Scottish 
Government 2014c, table 6, p. 61) 
 Glasgow, whilst retaining the dubious distinction of being the most violent city 
in Scotland, nevertheless shared in the falls in incidents during these periods, 
with non-sexual crimes of violence falling by over 50% between 2008/09 and 
2013/14 (Scottish Government 2009, Table 6, p. 25 and Scottish Government 
2014c, table 6, p. 61) 
4.21 Thus any judgement of the impact of the Act has to be made against the 
backdrop of sustained and historic falls in violent crime not only in Scotland, but 
across the UK as a whole (Office for National Statistics, 2014). Some insight may 
be gained from additional questions added to the 2012/13 Scottish Crime and 
Justice Survey which looked more closely at the sorts of harassment, intimidation 
and insult that might be seen by many as a key target of the Act.   10% of 
respondents in the survey reported being insulted, pestered or intimidated in some 
way in the previous months, though for the large majority (over 80%) this did not 
extend beyond verbal insult or harassment (Scottish Government 2014b, p. 68).   
However, when the survey probed victims to see what they thought lay behind the 
offenders‟ behaviour (such as an intention to insult the victim on the basis of their 
race or ethnicity), only a quarter of respondents provided a possible motive.  Of this 
sub-set, some 8% felt the intimidation or harassment was motivated by issues of 
ethnicity and race, whilst 4% of men, and 1% of female respondents who had been 
victimised identified sectarianism as a possible motivating factor.  Given this very 
low level of prevalence of victim-identified sectarian harassment or intimidation, it is 
unsurprising that only 3% of survey respondents as a whole reported being 
„worried‟ or „very worried‟ about being „insulted, pestered or intimidated due to 
sectarianism‟ (ibid p. 68) compared to 25% of the sample being worried about being 
assaulted or attacked in the street, or 19% of the sample being worried about being 
caught up in violence between groups (e.g. gangs). (ibid, p. 62). 
4.22 Though the Act is not focused on domestic abuse, a number of respondents 
during this research speculated that incidents of domestic violence might increase 
as supporters – frustrated by controls on their behaviour in stadia – would take out 
their frustration on their partners and spouses.  Such assertions would be hard to 
evidence. Whilst research has shown associations between football and domestic 
violence (Brooks et al, 2014), these associations cannot be shown to demonstrate 
a direct, causal relationship (as opposed to football and domestic violence sharing 
some common features, such as attracting certain types of problematic men, being 
associated with leisure time and public holidays, and being associated with the 
consumption of alcohol).   Moreover, again, here too, Scottish Crime survey 
figures67 show, an albeit very modest, fall in self-reported domestic violence 
                                         
67
 footnote: police figures do not provide reliable trends for this crime type given that only 13% of 
victims are estimated to confide in the police, and in total only 21% of all incidents come to the 
attention of the police by some means (MacQueen, 2014 , p. 33) 
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(between partners), with incidents of psychological and physical abuse declining 
from 5% of respondents in 2008/09 to 3% in 2012/13 (MacQueen, 2014, p. 11). 
4.23 The most targeted approach to trying to measure the impact of the Act would 
be to look at levels of arrest or charge in and around stadia on match days. Such 
an approach though would have some fundamental limitations. Aside from the 
aforementioned changes in the composition of Scottish leagues, and associated 
changes in fixtures and rivalries, levels of arrest and charge in and around stadia 
may be said to be particularly prone to changes in policing, and changes in decision 
making around charging.   These are of course, precisely areas that have been 
subject to significant and deliberate change, not merely as a result of the 
introduction of the Act, but also associated developments such as the 
establishment of FoCUS, and largely coincidental developments such as the 
establishment of Police Scotland. Changes in levels of arrest and charge might 
therefore be said to be as likely to reflect these changes in policing and criminal 
justice decision making as any „natural‟ change in the propensity of individuals to 
commit offences in and around football.  With these substantial caveats in mind 
there are three readily available sources of data on trends in football related 
offending.   First, there are police recorded crime statistics, which chart the number 
of incidents at, or around football. Incidents, it should be noted, are not the same as 
charges, as a single incident might involve a number of individuals charged with a 
number of different offences.  
 
Table 4.7 Breach of the peace and s. 1 and s. 6 OBFTC Act 
offences, 2004-05 to 2013-14 (recorded crime 
incidents) 1 
  
Crime category 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
Breach of the 
peace
2
 
87,403 58,432 33,710 25,072 21,755 
% change on 
previous year 
 -33% -42% -26% -13% 
Offensive behaviour 
at football 
3
 
- - [22] 154 126 
% change on 
previous year 
    -18% 
Threatening 
communications
3
 
- - [1] 41 11 
% change on 
previous year 
    -73% 
 
Notes: 
1. Taken from Scottish Government 2014c, Table A8, p. 74 
2. This is a sub-category of the larger offence category of „breach of the peace‟ which normally incorporates 
section 1 charges.  
3. Offences introduced in March 2012 
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4.24 Table 4.7 shows a reasonable decline in section 1 charges between 2012-13 
(the first full year of the Act‟s use) and 2013-14.   However, first, two years‟ of data 
does not give us a sufficient period to make any judgements about trends; second, 
any reduction must be viewed in the context of much larger reductions in breach of 
the peace that occur both concurrently with, but also long before, the introduction of 
the Act.  Finally, the figures provide some pause for thought in appreciating, in 
particular relative to the attention paid to the Act, how few incidents there are 
actually recorded under section 1.  
4.25 An alternative snapshot of football-related offending can be found in looking 
again at figures compiled by the football banning order authority (now located 
alongside FoCUS). These figures cover s.1 offences but also breach of the peace 
(s. 38), or culpable and reckless conduct (typically flares or smoke bombs covered 
under s. 20 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995), or any other 
type of offence that was linked to a football match68. It should be noted however 
that the figures do not incorporate offences that might be more „distantly‟ linked 
(e.g. an incidence of domestic violence at a residential property). Nevertheless, 
whilst like all the figures reported here, these figures are far from perfect, they 
perhaps better attempt to capture than others the „footprint‟ of crime and disorder 
associated with football matches. 
 
Table 4.8 Offences Reported to the Football Banning Authority 
Football seasons All offences % change 
2011-12  428 
 2012-13 355 -17% 
2013-14  323 -9% 
2014-15   323¹ n/c 
Notes: 
1. Annual figure up to February 2015 is 246 – the total for the remainder of the relevant year is estimated using the 
typical proportion of annual offences occurring in the remaining period between 2011-12 and 2013-14. 
 
4.26 Though direct comparison with Table 4.7 is difficult due to different reporting 
periods these figures do nevertheless evidence similar trends, with fairly substantial 
declines in charges in the first two years of the Act, though with a possible „levelling 
out‟ in the most recent football season.   
4.27 One final data source that provides some broad indications of trends in 
football related offending is data complied on section 1 charges by the Crown 
Office. These statistics were reported on in detail in Skivington &  Mckenna (2014):  
 
 
 
 
                                         
68
 though excluding offences such as being „drunk and incapable‟ or alcohol- related offences 
covered in the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 
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Table 4.9 Section 1 Charges 2012/13 to 2013/14 
(adapted from table 6 in Skivington 
& Mckenna, 2014, p. 7) 
  
2012/13 2013/14 
Total number of charges 268 203 
% change 
 
-24% 
Number of Rangers/Celtic charges¹ 153 103 
% of all charges 57% 51% 
Section 1 charge sub-categories² 
Total number of sub-charges 290 234 
of which 'religion'  106 (37%) 60 (26%) 
of which 'support for a terrorist 
organisation or celebrating loss of life'  
46 (16%) 57 (24%) 
of which 'race/ethnicity‟  19 (6%) 17 (7%) 
of which „sexual orientation‟  0 1 (<1%) 
of which making threats/challenging 
other to fight 
119 (41%) 99 42% 
 
Notes: 
1. Club-affiliation of individuals charged with offences 
2. Some charges involved multiple sub-charges, so sub-charge totals are not the same as charge totals 
 
4.28 Again, these statistics evidence a similar decline in charges during the first 
and second full years of the Act‟s operation.   The figures also detail how 
supporters of Rangers and Celtic continue to attract the majority of s. 1 charges, 
though at a slightly lower rate in 2013/14 than in the previous year. Crown Office 
figures also allow us to examine the changing characteristics of charges in terms of 
which elements of s.1 they relate to.   Whilst offensive behaviour offences under s. 
1 remain the main type of charge in both years, there are some notable changes in 
the types of crime that predominate. Notably, s. 1 was hardly used in either year to 
tackle offensive behaviour offences targeted at someone‟s sexual orientation, and 
was only used sparingly to target race-related offences.  In contrast, the proportion 
of charges relating to showing support for a terrorist organisation or celebrating loss 
of life rose markedly between the first and second year of the Act‟s operation.  
The limited use of s.1 to tackle homophobic or race-related offensiveness seems 
surprising given that, whilst not as prominent in the experiences of supporters in our 
survey or focus groups as religious offensiveness, these were forms of 
offensiveness that nevertheless attracted particular opprobrium, and indeed in our 
2013-14 survey were experienced fairly frequently (see table 4.2, page 57).  For 
instance, 22% of survey respondents witnessed negative references to sexuality 
when attending away games in the 2013/14 season, but only one conviction was 
recorded for offensive behaviour based on sexual orientation in that period.  
4.29 In summary, what can these various sources of data tell us about trends in 
football related crime and disorder, and more specifically about the impact of the 
Act? There have been significant declines in officially-designated football-related 
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offences though the available data covers far too short a span of time to allow one 
to reliably associate any trends with the introduction of the Act, or indeed the 
associated attention and resources given to the policing of football-related offences 
both in the year running up the introduction of the Act (2011-2012), and in the 
immediate aftermath of its introduction.  Whilst football-related offences have 
declined, there are two key competing explanations for this decline, both of which 
are plausible, and both of which may have partially contributed to the observed 
declines: 
 The drop in charges reflects a genuine decline in disorder and offensive 
behaviour. 
 The initial peak of charges in the first full year of the Act naturally dropped off 
after the initial wave of publicity, and the keen attention given to implementing 
the Act by the Police and other relevant partners, subsided. 
4.30 Our survey findings provide tentative support for the notion that at least some 
of these reductions may be due to a real improvement in offensive and disorderly 
behaviour on match days. However the extent to which these reductions can be 
attributed to the impact of the Act is far from clear, not least given the substantial 
and sustained reductions in many categories of violence and disorder across 
Scotland and the UK as whole.   
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5. Concluding remarks  
5.1 How best are we to judge the effectiveness of section 1 the OBFTC Act?  
Arguably the „bottom line‟ measure(s) relate to actual levels of offensiveness, in 
particular as experienced by fans themselves, but also via secondary indicators 
such as official recorded crime figures and conviction statistics.  In this respect, the 
data that are available would certainly suggest that offensiveness at matches has 
declined, as most persuasively evidenced by our surveys of fans, and reinforced in 
interviews with fans and stakeholders alike.  
5.2 There are of course a number of hefty qualifications that must be applied to 
prevent any premature attribution of this reduction to the Act itself.   There are 
figures to suggest that these reductions to an extent pre-date the Act. Nevertheless 
a good number of fans and stakeholders interviewed through this research noted 
that there had been a marked drop around the period of the Act‟s Introduction, in 
particular a reduction in those forms of offensiveness that were widely perceived to 
be the central target of the Act.   Even some of the fans most strongly opposed to 
the Act, whilst bemoaning the dearth of match day atmosphere that followed in their 
view the clamp down on their favoured songs and chants, had nevertheless 
emphatically stopped singing those songs.  That said, whether this reduction was 
due to the Act itself or to the policing and prosecution resources put in place 
sometime before the Act is impossible to answer.  At one level it may be argued 
that this is a moot point, in so far as these developments were all complementary 
parts of the same drive to address the problems in football that flowed from the 
events on and off the pitch during the 2010-11 season.  Certainly our work would 
suggest that what marks out the Act is not (primarily) that it stakes out some wholly 
new territory, bringing within the ambit of the criminal law behaviours that were 
previously free from any legal sanction. Rather it is the political intent behind the 
legislation that distinguishes the Act. This, combined with the resources that 
complemented its introduction, emboldened the authorities to bring more 
prosecutions and strengthened the law through highlighting and clarifying what the 
problems with these offensive behaviours were, thereby facilitating more successful 
prosecutions (at least initially). 
5.3 It was apparent both from our surveys and from our qualitative research that 
most fans knew what songs and remarks were offensive.  Nevertheless, one 
recurring criticism of the Act is that it leaves it substantially open for the police, 
acting in the capacity of the reasonable person, to exert a high degree of discretion 
in determining whether behaviour is offensive. A constant theme in many fan focus 
groups was that supporters needed greater clarity, and definitive lists, about what 
songs or remarks were offensive, and that they should not be subject to the 
variable standards of different police officers, or to future changes in terms of what 
society may or may not deem as offensive. However, the fact that social standards 
and normative values do change, and that the law needs to be dynamic enough to 
cope with such change, is a fairly accepted and commonplace observation.  
Relatedly, there will always be tests in terms of behaviours that raise genuine 
uncertainty in terms of their acceptability and legality, and that may be subjected to 
legitimate debate and in some instances subject to judicial determination.  Equally, 
it has to be acknowledged that offensiveness is very contextual, that behaviour that 
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goes unremarked in one context, may be dangerously inflammatory in another.  
The need to be alive to context, and for the law to be applied in a way that is 
flexible enough to cope with context, is not the same as the law being applied 
inconsistently, and whilst some fans did raise examples that would suggest some 
instances of unwarranted inconsistency in decision making, in other instances what 
seemed to be being described was a sensible attention to context.    
5.4 Conversely conversations around the Act also at times seem to attract a 
slightly artificial commentary, dividing football fans into a false binary between 
certain fans of Celtic and Rangers who use games to vent bile and bigotry, and 
most other types of fans who merely  want to attend games free from any „banter‟ 
or offensiveness. This was not evidenced in our research. Many otherwise relatively 
sedate fans often talked nevertheless about enjoying the atmosphere created by 
younger fans who were engaged in singing and „banter‟. Whilst one comparatively 
„middle-class‟ focus group of fans from the East of Scotland described motivations 
for going to games that clearly gave primacy to songs and to „winding up‟ the 
opposition (including „wind-ups‟ that actually fell squarely within the reach of the 
Act). Winding up the opposition might certainly be argued to be a fairly deeply-
rooted aspect of football „fandom‟. The question is whether, and when, „winding-up‟ 
oversteps a certain line, when it becomes unacceptably offensive and/or threatens 
disorder. What our fan focus groups certainly demonstrated is that it is not always 
straightforward to define where this line sits, or indeed to preclude the possibility 
that otherwise law abiding fans might occasionally inadvertently cross such a line. 
In these instances, some element of discretion and dialogue between the police, 
stewards and fans seemed helpful, and in particular self-policing amongst fans as a 
mechanism to ward off the emergence of clearly offensive behaviour.   
5.5 Fans and stakeholder participants alike therefore at times seemed to create 
an artificial binary between behaviour that merited no attention and behaviour that 
fell within the remit of the criminal law. In reality, such a dichotomy masks the fact 
that there is a sliding scale of offensiveness that requires the involvement of fans 
and clubs before, and/or as well as, criminal justice agencies, and that would 
recommend the use of other non-criminal remedies and sanctions for behaviour 
that falls in this problematic middle ground.   
5.6 There was strong evidence to show that the Act in the short term had created 
an atmosphere of mistrust and tension between the police, stewards and some fan 
groups.   In this research it was notable how often indeed fan groups, who 
conventionally had nothing to do with the violent risk groups that engaged in 
traditional football „hooliganism,‟ were often referred to in terms of being „risk 
groups‟. This widening conception of football fans in terms of „risk‟ seemed 
unhelpful.  It could be argued that the Act was always going to attract hostility in 
some quarters because it attempted to tackle long-standing and long-cherished 
behaviours that had gone comparatively unchallenged.  However, it would seem 
critical going forward that relations between fans, clubs, stewards and the police 
are appreciably improved, as constructive relations are critical both in terms of the 
enjoyment of the match day experience, but also if match days are to remain safe 
occasions.  There is a substantial and distinguished repository of academic 
research that has persuasively evidenced how order is better maintained at football 
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if the police have a good relationship with the majority of fans, and adopt where 
possible a less confrontational „public order‟ style of operation, working with fans to 
self-police (Stott et. al., 2012; Hoggett and Stott 2010; Stott and Pearson 2007). 
This indeed is a style of policing that Scotland has traditionally had a reputation for 
excelling in, and we should be reluctant to relinquish it.      
5.7 One final means through which one might judge the „success‟ of the Act is in 
terms of the number of convictions. Here of course there has been a recent fall in 
the rate of convictions.  What is behind this fall is open to question.  Some of our 
judicial respondents did comment that there were issues with the quality of 
evidence, although whether this indicates some issue with official capability further 
down the criminal justice „pipeline‟ or whether it in fact indicates that more difficult 
or more controversial cases are now being brought to court, is unclear. A low 
conviction rate might also be problematic for the credibility of the Act. Many of the 
section 1 charges are for comparatively less-serious behaviours, and in such cases 
it is open to question whether it is fair or proportionate to subject charged 
individuals to long periods of uncertainty (often combined with quite stringent bail 
conditions) when the probability of being found guilty is comparatively quite low69.  
Here, it may be prudent particularly for less serious charges - to consider faster, 
diversionary measures, leaving the full weight of the criminal process (with its 
attendant cost implications and further burdens on the criminal justice system) to 
more serious offences.  
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 Though it may be, of course, that in the Scottish jurisdiction offences of equivalent seriousness 
that are not football-related, take equivalent periods of time to be concluded. 
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How to access background or source data 
 
The data collected for this social research publication: 
☐ are available in more detail through Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics      
☐ are available via an alternative route <specify or delete this text> 
☒ may be made available on request, subject to consideration of legal and ethical 
factors. Please contact Ben.Cavanagh@Scotland.gsi.gov.uk for further information. 
☐ cannot be made available by Scottish Government for further analysis as 
Scottish Government is not the data controller.      
 
© Crown copyright 2015
You may re-use this information (excluding logos and images) free of charge 
in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. 
To view this licence, visit http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-
government-licence/or e-mail: psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk.
Where we have identified any third party copyright information  
you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned.
The views expressed in this report are those of the researcher and
do not necessarily represent those of the Scottish Government or
Scottish Ministers.
This document is also available from our website at www.gov.scot.
ISBN: 978-1-78544-458-6
The Scottish Government
St Andrew’s House
Edinburgh
EH1 3DG
Produced for  
the Scottish Government  
by APS Group Scotland
PPDAS51421 (06/15)
Published by  
the Scottish Government,  
June 2015
research
social
Social Research series
ISSN 2045 6964
ISBN 978-1-78544-458-6
Web and Print Publication
www.gov.scot/socialresearch
PPDAS51421 (06/15)
